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11. Introduction
This report has been prepared by SPRU for the Department of Trade and Industry, as
part of the project Developing Guidance for UK Emissions Trading Projects. This
project is co-ordinated by the Centre for Environmental Strategy at the University of
Surrey, and also involves the Joint Implementation Network at the University of
Groningen.
The aim of the report to provide an overview of existing and proposed EU and UK
climate policies that will be relevant to assessing the additionality of proposed
emissions trading projects. Climate policy is interpreted in a broad sense here to
include all policies that have a primary or secondary aim of reducing GHG emissions.
These include policies that are often classified under other headings, such as waste
policy. The report contributes to Phase 1 of the project, Advice on Key Policy Issues,
and should be read in conjunction with the other contributions to Phase 1 - in
particular the work on defining additionality.
 1.1 Priority sectors
The DTI has advised that the following five ‘sectors’ are priority areas for emissions
trading projects:
• Built environment
• CHP (including Micro CHP)
• Electricity generation
• Methane recovery from landfill and mines
• Transport
The DTI has also advised that the domestic sector has been ruled out for emissions
trading projects.
Two points about this list should be noted. First, the list combines industrial sectors
(electricity generation) with particular technologies (CHP).  This means that there is
considerable overlap between the ‘sectors’.  For example, CHP projects may be used
in methane recovery and in buildings, while electricity generation plant may be
fuelled by methane from landfill and thereby qualify as renewable electricity under
the UK Renewables Obligation.  As a result, there is corresponding overlap between
the policies that are relevant to each ‘sector’. Table 1.1 groups climate policy under
five broad headings and indicates which of the five sectors these influence.
Second, the rationale for excluding the domestic sector from the crediting scheme is
unclear.  This also leads to the exclusion of community heating CHP projects and the
majority of micro-CHP projects, despite the latter being specifically identified on the
priority list. Following this advice, policies relevant to the domestic sector are not
included in this report. But comments questioning the rationale for this decision are
included in Annex 1.
2Table 1.1 Mapping policy areas onto the priority sectors
Buildings CHP Electricity
generation
Methane
recovery
Transport
Energy supply policy    
Energy efficiency policy   
Waste policy   
Transport policy 
Land use policy  
 1.2 Report structure
The report is structured as follows.
Section 1 provides an introductory discussion of the role of projects in the UK ETS,
an interpretation of additionality and policy additionality, a classification scheme for
climate policy, and a brief discussion of the problems of system boundaries and
leakage in crediting schemes. Here it is noted that if the changes brought about by a
project are already required, funded, supported or encouraged by other policy
initiatives there is a risk that the policy additionality requirement will not been met.
The importance of individual policies will depend upon the methodology that is
chosen for estimating additionality.
The following five sections examine the priority sectors in turn and seek to identify
those policies that require, fund, support or encourage carbon abatement in each
sector. For the first four priority sectors, the structure is as follows:
• indicating the contribution of the sector to UK carbon emissions and carbon
abatement;
• identifying some potential project types in the sector;
• listing the major policy influences on the sector, using the framework developed
in section 1; and
• describing a selection of these policies in more detail, and discussing their
implications for the assessment of additionality.
For the transport sector, the description of individual policies is omitted. This is
because the range of policies relevant to projects in this sector is extremely large.  A
more detailed evaluation is not possible within the scope of the current project.
Many policies (e.g. the climate change levy) are relevant to more than one sector.
Generally, such policies are only described once in the report, and then cross-
referenced in subsequent sections with the relevant issues identified.
The report draws on research in the project Interaction in EU Climate Policy, funded
by the European Commission under the Framework 5 Program and co-ordinated by
SPRU.1
                                                
1 http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/environment/research/interact.html
32. Projects, additionality and UK climate
policy
This section provides an introductory discussion of the role of projects in the UK
ETS, an interpretation of additionality and policy additionality, a classification
scheme for climate policy, and a brief discussion of the problems of system
boundaries and leakage in crediting schemes.
 2.1 The position of projects in the UKETS
There are three types of participant in the UKETS:
• cap and trade (the absolute sector);
• sectoral baseline and credit (the CCLA sector);
• project baseline and credit (the project sector).
The basic structure is illustrated in Figure 1.1. The CCLA sector consists of firms
participating in a Climate Change Levy Agreement (CCLA). These can be split into
two groups: those having relative targets (GWh/output; tCO2e/output), and those
having absolute targets (GWh or tCO2e). The trading rules differ between these two
groups, so it is useful to further distinguish between:
• the CCLA relative sector: those CCLA companies with relative targets
• the CCLA absolute sector: those CCLA companies with absolute targets
Figure 1.2 shows this additional subdivision and also illustrates the possible trading
routes between different sectors in the scheme.
4Figure1.1 Structure of the UK emissions trading scheme
Figure 1.2 Trading routes in the UK emissions trading scheme
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5The three basic sectors are as follows:
• Cap and trade (absolute sector): The focus of the proposals is a cap and trade
scheme for organisations that take on an absolute emissions target. The most
important point to note is that this is a voluntary scheme in which a financial
incentive is provided by government to encourage organisations to take on a cap.
This means that the scope of the scheme will depend upon the response to the
incentive and is not defined at the outset. A total of £215 million has been made
available, equivalent to £30 million per year after corporation tax.  Participating
organisations will be required to make absolute reductions in emissions against a
1998-2000 baseline. The target and the level of incentive payment will be set
through a competitive bidding process, subject to certain rules including a limit on
the proportion of the total incentive going to a single participant. Organisations
will be required to deliver five equal annual emission reductions to qualify for the
incentive payments. A wide range of organisations in the industrial, commercial
and public sectors are eligible to participate, but not sources that are already
subject to a CCLA. Participating organisations that are eligible for the Climate
Change Levy (CCL) will still be required to pay it.
• Sectoral baseline and credit (CCLA sector): The second element of the scheme
relates to energy intensive companies that already have targets through the CCLAs.
These targets are denominated in either energy use (GWh), energy intensity
(GWh/unit of output), GHG emissions (MtC equivalent), or GHG intensity
(MtC/unit of output) and apply at two yearly intervals up to 2010. Such companies
will be able to use the trading scheme to help meet their target or to sell any over-
achievement if they do better than their target. Most of the targets under the
CCLAs are defined in terms of energy intensity (unit targets) rather than carbon
emissions (absolute targets).  This creates problems for participation in a trading
scheme as increases in output from a sector can lead to increases in emissions - i.e.
there is not the certainty of an absolute emissions cap.  As a consequence of this,
trading by CCLA participants with relative targets will be subject to restrictions to
prevent inflation in the total number of allowances. In particular a ‘Gateway’ will
control the flow of allowances from the CCLA sector into the rest of the trading
scheme.
• Project baseline and credit (project sector): The third and least developed element
of the scheme relates to individual emission reduction projects. Organisations will
be able to undertake such projects in the UK and sell the resulting allowances into
the scheme.  The allowances can then be used by other participants to meet their
targets.  As with JI & CDM, the project must deliver emission reductions which
are additional to business as usual.
 2.2 Defining additionality
The primary requirement for project based activities is that the emission reductions
associated with the project are additional - i.e. they would not have occurred in the
absence of the project.  In practice, additionality is demonstrated by comparing
project emissions with the ‘business–as-usual’ or baseline emissions scenario.
 Two broad types of additionality can be distinguished:
6• Environmental additionality: This is determined by quantifying the difference
between the GHG emissions of the project and those of a baseline scenario, where
the latter is a counterfactual estimate of emissions. The requirement for a baseline
introduces an irreducible element of uncertainty into project crediting.
• Financial additionality: This is subject to varying interpretations. One is where a
project would not have been financially viable in the absence of additional
revenue from the sale of credits.  Another is where institutional, financial
technological or informational barriers to the project would not have been
overcome without the incentive provided by the crediting arrangements.  In
practice, this requirement is very difficult to operationalise.
The baseline scenario is a projection of emissions over an appropriate time period.  At
its simplest, this may be an extrapolation of current trends. At its most complex, it
could involve a simulation of future investment decisions and technology
performance. The estimation of a scenario could therefore imply differing degrees of
complexity and resources intensiveness.
The development of a baseline scenario may require assumptions about technical,
economic, financial, regulatory and political circumstances over the duration of the
scenario. These may include assumptions about existing or planned climate policy
instruments. For example, when developing the baseline for an industrial CHP
project, it may be necessary to consider the impact of the Climate Change Levy
(CCL) on emissions from the site. This will include estimates of the improvement in
fuel and electrical efficiency throughout the site that would result from the CCL price
incentive. Emissions from the site are likely to be lower with the CCL than without,
and this reduction may need to factored into the scenario. If this were not done (e.g. if
the baseline assumed that emissions remained unchanged), the estimated emission
reductions resulting from the CHP project would be overestimated, and with it the
number of credits.
In addition, it may be necessary to consider whether the project would have gone
ahead anyway in a business-as-usual scenario.  This will be particularly relevant in the
case of a CHP project for example, as CHP is exempt from the CCL and is hence a
more attractive investment.  But to assess this, it would be necessary to simulate likely
investment decisions during the course of the scenario.  This is a very difficult
undertaking, and would require assumptions about appropriate investment criteria;
and the role and importance of different barriers to investment, such as hidden costs
and risk. These are complex and contentious issues (Sorrell, 2000).
Consideration of the existing and planned climate policy mix can be a central element
in such determinations of additionality. The relevant question is whether the emission
reductions would have been achieved by existing or planned climate policy in the
absence of the crediting scheme. If the emission reductions were required by some
aspect of climate policy (e.g. an emission limit), then there is no additionality from
the project. This is the simplest case, but it may be relatively rare in practice. What is
more likely is that the climate policy instruments change the counterfactual baseline
by making an investment more likely to go ahead. For example, the existence of the
CCL makes the CHP project more likely to go ahead.
7In the first, case additionality can be determined solely in relation to climate policy
targets and is relatively simple to assess. In the second case, additionality must be
assessed in relation to a baseline scenario, which includes estimates of the impact of
climate policy instruments. This requires assessment of the economics of different
projects and how these are changed by the existence of the instruments. Political
circumstances may also be relevant – such as where the existence of a voluntary target
provides a greater incentive to make energy efficiency investments.  In general, if the
changes brought about by a project are already required, funded, supported or
encouraged by other policy initiatives, there is a risk that the policy additionality
requirement will not be met.
A range of policies may need to be considered when developing a project baseline.
Assumptions may be required about the impact of:
• existing policy measures;
• planned policy measures, where details such as date of introduction are known;
and
• possible policy measures, where there are varying degrees of uncertainty.
The importance of these will depend upon the duration of the baseline or crediting
period, and whether or not baselines may be adjusted during their lifetime.  For
example, the longer the duration of the baseline the greater the importance of possible
policy measures.  In turn, the nature of planned or possible policy measures may
influence decisions on the duration and adjustment of baselines.
For the UK project scheme, the greatest uncertainty relates to proposed EU Emissions
Trading Directive (EUETS) (CEC, 2001a). There are uncertainties over the date of
introduction of this scheme, whether it will be mandatory, and a range of detailed
design issues such as allocation rules. But the inclusion of electricity generators
within the EU scheme seems certain. This is important as it creates a serious conflict
with both the UKETS and broader UK climate policy, such as the CCLAs.  This is
because the latter effectively assigns ownership of ESI emissions to electricity
consumers, while the EUETS assigns ownership to electricity generators. This issue is
of fundamental importance to the UK project scheme, and is discussed in more detail
in section 4.7.
 2.3 Characterising climate policy
 It is common in the climate policy literature to use a simple binary classification of
policy instruments, with ‘command and control’ on the one hand and ‘economic
instruments’ on the other.  This greatly oversimplifies the reality of climate policy,
where a much broader range of instruments are employed. There are numerous ways
of classifying these instruments, none of which are entirely satisfactory as there are
numerous overlaps between instrument categories. For example, are negotiated
agreements a voluntary approach or a command & control approach? Is a site bubble
an economic instrument or a command & control regulation?.
 
 Table 1.2 proposes a broad classification of climate policy instruments for use in this
survey. The table lists policy categories in increasing order of prescriptiveness . At
8one extreme a technology-based standard unambiguously requires the adoption of a
particular technology. At the other extreme an education programme merely provides
a weak incentive for a particular form of action.  While all these policies will be
relevant to a discussion of additionality, their importance will vary with their level of
prescriptiveness.  The impact of highly prescriptive policies which require a certain
action is very easy to assess.  In contrast, the impact of weakly prescriptive policies
such as information programmes is virtually impossible to assess. The impact of
policies in the middle of this range, such as energy taxes, may be very important for
the assessment of additionality, but difficult to assess as it requires assessment of
project economics and the relative importance of different barriers to investment.
 
 In sections 3 to 7, the specific policy measures relevant to each priority area (e.g.
CHP) will be classified according to this framework. In each case, we will describe a
subset of these policies in more detail. The policies selected will be the more
prescriptive ones - i.e. those that seem particularly important in the assessment of
project additionality.
 
9Table 1.2 A typology of climate policy instruments
 Broad category  Instrument type  Nature  UK Climate Program examples
 Education,
information &
moral suasion
 Education, information
& moral suasion
 Corrects lack of information, builds
capacity to respond, appeals to values
and/or attempts to modify values
• Energy efficiency best practice
program
• Energy labelling of domestic
appliances
• Design Advice Scheme
 Voluntary
approaches
 Unilateral commitments
 
 Voluntary undertaking by firms or
industry groups
• Voluntary energy efficiency
agreements (e.g. hotel sector)
  Public voluntary
schemes
 Voluntary adoption of standards,
procedures, targets etc. which have
been developed by public bodies
• Making a Corporate Commitment
Campaign
• EMAS
  Negotiated agreements  Contracts between public authorities
and industry including targets,
timetable and implicit or explicit
sanctions for non compliance.
• Climate change levy agreements
 Economic
instruments
 Charge systems  Internalises external costs through
charges on consumption or
production
• Climate change levy
  Trading mechanisms  Creates a market in pollution rights • UKETS cap and trade program
• UKETS credit program
• Renewables obligation certificates
  Financial instruments  Mobilising financial resources for
environmental protection (e.g. loans,
funds, tax breaks)
• Enhance capital allowances for
investment in energy efficient
equipment
• Subsidies of energy audits
10
  Liability instruments  Inducement to internalise external
costs through threat of subsequent
legal action to recover costs
  Removal of perverse
incentives
 Removal of existing subsidies to
environmentally damaging activities
and products
• Removal of subsidies for coal
production
 Command and
control
 Framework based
standards
 Qualitative performance
requirements requiring interpretation
• BAT in IPPC
  Performance based
standards
 Uniform quantitative performance
requirements
• Building regulations
  Technology based
standards
 Uniform requirement to use a
particular technology
• Building regulations
 Source: Sorrell (2000)
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 2.4 Project particpants, system boundaries and leakage
Project participants
There are three parties that are relevant:
• Investors: These are legal entities who see regulatory or commercial benefits in
sponsoring projects. They may be either private or public organisations and may be either
national, foreign or multinational.
• Users of credits: These are the legal entities who wish to obtain credits to meet their
regulatory obligations. Users may either be located in the UK or overseas. In the latter
case, prior to 2008 there needs to be bilateral agreement on the transfer of credits between
the UK and other countries. Post 2008, the transfer must be consistent with the
international rules for JI and IET.
• Hosts: These are the organisations who have interests in the project itself.  For example, a
local authority will have an interest in an energy efficiency project located within social
housing in its area.  Similarly, a firm will have interests in a CHP project on its site.
While the project itself must be physically located within the UK, the host organisation
may be foreign or multinational.
The investor and user may be identical - for example, if a company subject to a CCLA invests
in an external project (e.g. methane recovery) with the aim of using the credit towards its
CCLA target.  Similarly, the investor and host may be identical - for example, where an
industrial firm which is not subject to either the CCLAs or the cap & trade scheme invests in
a CHP project on its own site, and sells the resulting credits to a company within the UKETS.
It is even possible for the investor, host and user to be one and the same company - for
example, a CCLA company could host a project on one of its sites, with the aim of reducing
emissions from sources that lie outside the CCLA facility, and then use the credit to meet
CCLA obligations.
System boundaries
Policy additionality is considered in terms of the physical circumstances of the project, and
hence the policy influences on the host.  For example, in the case of a CHP unit on an
industrial site, the relevant policies are those directly influencing the host organisation (e.g.
the CCL with exemptions for CHP fuel).  In this case, the policies influencing the investor
and user are not relevant, unless they are one and the same company as the host.
This picture is complicated however, when we consider the appropriate system boundary for
the project.  The issue here is the extent to which the project can be considered to be
separable from the rest of the energy system.  If it can (to a first approximation), then the
system boundary can be roughly coincident with the project.  For example, switching from
coal to gas at an industrial site will have a minimal influence on the rest of the energy system.
But in other cases, the project will have broader influences throughout the energy system.
This is particularly case for electricity. For example, an efficient lighting program within the
domestic sector generation will impact upon generation emissions throughout the ESI, as
would a large scale wind farm or CHP installation.  In these cases, estimation of the project
baseline will require assessment of the impacts on the whole system, perhaps through the use
of a system model.
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These considerations are highly relevant to policy additionality.  If the system boundary is at
the project level, then the consideration of relevant policies can be confined to those affecting
the host.  If, however, the system boundary is at the system or national level, then a much
broader range of policies becomes relevant.  At a national level, the entire climate program
becomes relevant to a discussion of additionality.
The discussion in this report will focus on the policies directly affecting the project host – i.e.
it will assume a narrow system boundary. This is not to second-guess the final choice of
system boundary for different types of project, but merely to keep the scope of the report
within manageable bounds.
Leakage and double counting
Two important issues for emission reduction projects are leakage and double counting:
• Leakage: The emission reductions achieved by the project will be defined in relation to a
system boundary. For example, a boiler conversion to gas will reduce emissions within an
industrial site, where the latter defines the system boundary.  But it is possible that
emissions outside of the system boundary will increase as a direct or indirect result of the
project’s activities. This phenomenon is termed leakage (carbon leakage for CO2). The
causal chains leading to leakage can be complex, such as when the capital equipment
used by the project has a high embodied energy.
• Double counting: The emission reductions created by the project will be used to generate
a carbon credit. But there is a risk that the project will also be used to fulfil other
regulatory obligations, such as counting towards increases in renewable energy capacity.
Situations such as this can lead to the double counting of emission reductions.
Additionality, leakage and double counting are inter-linked. Problems of double counting
already arise within the UKETS in relation to its interface with other schemes such as the
Renewables Obligation. This is partly a consequence of the increasing complexity of UK
climate policy. It is important to ensure that the project scheme does not compound this
problem.  Again, the future implementation of the EUETS is a critical issue. For example,
projects in the ESI that generate credits may subsequently be brought under the umbrella of
the EUETS and then be used to free up allowances.
 2.5 Summary
This section has described the basic concepts of additionality and policy additionality, and
provided a framework for classifying relevant climate policies. This framework will be used
in the following five sections, which examine each of the priority sectors in turn.  Each
section will identify and classify those policies that require, fund, support or encourage
carbon abatement in the sector. Those policies which are considered particularly important
for policy additionality will be described in more detail, and the implications for additionality
identified. Brief comments will also be made on the potential project types in each sector.
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 3. Policies in the built environment area
The built environment can be divided into: a) non-domestic buildings, which includes public,
commercial, and industrial buildings; and b) domestic buildings, which includes houses and
flats.  The domestic sector is specifically excluded from the crediting scheme, so the
discussion in this section will be confined to non-domestic buildings. Energy use in these
buildings can be classified as either:
• energy use from installed equipment such as heating ventilation & air conditioning;
• energy use from non-installed equipment, such as computers.
The first is strongly influenced by the building envelope, while the latter is not. Table 3.1
illustrates that the non-domestic built environment (public, commercial & industrial
buildings) accounts for 19.4% of UK CO2 emissions. This table: a) assigns ESI energy use to
final users; b) includes energy use in both installed and non-installed equipment; and c)
excludes energy use in industrial processes and process emissions (which accounts for the
bulk of industrial energy use). Non-installed equipment accounts for around 20% of energy
use in public and commercial buildings, which means that around 16% of UK CO2 emissions
are from the non-domestic built environment sector (including indirect emissions from
electricity use).
Table 3.1 The contribution of buildings the UK carbon emissions
% of final
energy
% of CO2
emissions
% change
final energy
1970-94
% change
emissions
1970-94
Public/commercial buildings 12.5 14.8 +12.8 -26.4
Industrial buildings 4.0 4.6 -52.7 -9.2
Total non-domestic buildings 16.6 19.4 -15.9 -55.0
Domestic buildings 28.8 27.4 +18.3 -25.5
Total buildings 45.4 46.8 +2.3 -25.9
 3.1 Potential project types in the built environment area
Projects within this sector may be targeted at either the construction of new non-domestic
buildings, or the refurbishment of existing buildings.  The projects may affect the building
envelope, the heating system, the ventilation/air conditioning system or a combination of the
three. Similarly, the project may be focused on energy demand technologies (e.g. building
envelope measures such as improved insulation); energy supply technologies (e.g. energy
efficient condensing boilers; photovoltaic roof installations) or both. In each case, the project
would be likely to involve designs/technologies which go beyond the typical or required
performance of new/refurbished buildings. The latter defines the counterfactual baseline.
Behavioural changes, such as improved housekeeping, are unlikely to be candidates for
crediting projects although they are important for energy efficiency in the sector.
CHP projects may be an important source of potential credits in this sector, but the policies
relevant to these are discussed separately in section 5.
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 3.2 Policy influences in the built environment area
Table 3.2 summarises the most important policy measures in the built environment area,
using our standard classification system.  The following sections discuss a selection of these
policies, identifying their implications for the crediting scheme.
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Table 3.2 Climate policy measures in the built environment sector
 Broad category  Instrument type  Key instruments relevant to built environment sector
 Education,
information &
moral suasion
 Education, information
& moral suasion
• Energy Efficiency Best Practice Program
• Design Advice Scheme for new buildings
 Voluntary
approaches
 Unilateral commitments
 
• Voluntary energy efficiency agreements (e.g. hotel sector)
• Voluntary targets for the government estate and other public sector
buildings
  Public voluntary
schemes
• Making a Corporate Commitment Campaign
• Adoption of environmental management systems
  Negotiated agreements
 Economic
instruments
 Charge systems • Climate Change Levy
  Trading mechanisms • Voluntary participants in UKETS cap and trade program
  Financial instruments • Enhanced capital allowances for investment in qualifying energy efficient
technologies (all sectors) (£100m)
• Capital investment in public sector building/refurbishment projects, with
energy efficiency guidelines
• Support for PV installations
 Command and
control
 Framework based
standards
 
  Performance based
standards
• Revised building regulations Part L
• EU directive on the energy performance of buildings
  Technology based
standards
• Revised building regulations Part L
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 3.3 Voluntary energy efficiency agreements
Instrument description
The only example of a voluntary energy efficiency agreements at present is the ‘Hospitable
Climates’ programme of the Hotel & Catering International Management Association
(HCIMA). This was developed with the assistance of the EEBPp and came into being in
November 2001. The government hopes that agreements in other sectors will follow,
including higher education.
The overall target is to reduce carbon emissions from the hotels sector by 15% below 1999
levels by the end of 2010. Individual establishments choose to join the agreement by making
a commitment to improve energy efficiency - but need not individually commit to the 15%
target.  The Association, in collaboration with the EEBPp, provides support in the form of
benchmarking tools, information on energy efficiency opportunities, training materials,
online discussion groups and a helpline.
Additionality issues
Refurbishment projects in the hotel sector (or in other sectors with comparable agreements)
may generate credits as well as counting towards the agreement target.  To the extent that the
sector has already received support from the EEBPp, this may be viewed as a double reward.
Alternatively, it may be viewed as a valuable additional incentive, helping to guarantee
attainment of a non-binding voluntary target.
 3.4 Voluntary targets for the government estate & other public
sector buildings
Instrument description
Government initiatives for energy management on its own estate include introducing
environmental management schemes, reporting and benchmarking initiatives and a 1% per
annum improvement in performance against 1999-2000 levels over the period to 2010.
Similar targets have been endorsed by local authority associations for non-domestic buildings
owned by local authorities, but the implementation of this in individual authorities is uneven.
There are parallel initiatives to improve energy efficiency in schools, higher and further
education, the MoD, and the NHS, although in these cases there are no aggregate targets but
merely estimates of the possible savings to 2010. A proportion of these savings is included in
the estimated 0.5MtC/year savings from public sector buildings by 2010 given in the climate
program.  The saving is to be achieved through capital programmes, encouragement of
improved energy management, reporting & benchmarking initiatives promotion of low
energy design and so on.
Additionality issues
In developing individual projects in the sectors, a project baseline should reflect anticipated
efficiency improvements (e.g. 1%/year in the government estate) as far as 2010. It is possible
that the targets will be tightened post 2010, which may have implications for crediting
lifetimes. Beyond this, there seems no good reason to restrict crediting in these sectors of the
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grounds of existing voluntary targets. There may be implications for double counting in the
climate program if emission reductions from the crediting initiative are counted separately to
those from government targets.
 3.5 Making a Corporate Commitment Campaign (MACC2)
Instrument description
Public and private sector organisations may become signatories to MACC2 to demonstrate
their commitment to reducing GHG emissions.  To register for MACC2, an organisation must
publicly commit to specific improvement targets and report annually on progress.  Aside
from publicity, there is no additional public sector support, beyond that provided generally in
the EEBPp and other information programmes.
Additionality issues
Membership of MACC2 should not restrict eligibility for project crediting, but individual
project baselines may need to include the voluntary targets taken on under the scheme. There
are no implications for the climate program as MACC2 is too small (and uncertain) to have
aggregate reductions associated with it.
 3.6 Climate Change Levy (CCL)
Instrument description
The CCL applies to coal, gas and electricity use in the public, commercial and manufacturing
sectors. It does not apply to the transport and domestic sector, or to energy used by very small
firms which are classified as domestic.  Similarly, it does not apply to the upstream energy
sector, which includes oil refineries, gas plants and electricity generators.
 The CCL is a downstream energy tax, with electricity being taxed at the point of
consumption. Fuel use for electricity generation is exempt.  Oil products are also exempt, as
they are already subject to excise duties. Firms in energy intensive sectors have entered into
negotiated agreements (CCLAs) to give them exemption from 80% of the levy. These are
discussed further in section 5.5.
The CCL will increase the unit price of electricity by 0.43p/kWh, and that of gas and coal by
0.15p/kWh - corresponding to 11% increase in the average (1999) price of industrial
electricity and a 26% increase in the price of gas2. Using standard carbon contents, the fuel
price increase corresponds to £30/tonne CO2 for gas, £17.4/tonne for coal (direct emissions)
and £25/tonne CO2 for electricity (using an emission factor of 0.43 kgCO2 per kWh of
delivered electricity). Together with the exclusion of oil, these figures demonstrate the
variance of the CCL from a straightforward carbon tax. Fuel used in CHP is exempt from the
CCL, as is electricity purchased from certified renewable sources. Electricity from nuclear
generators is not exempt, despite being carbon free
                                                
2 This is unit prices and excludes standing charges. The percentage change will be greater for large sites as unit
prices are lower.  There have been large increases in UK gas prices since 1999, as a result of both increases in
global oil prices and connection with the wider European market.
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The CCL is expected to raise £1 billion in its first year, but most of this will be returned in
the form of a 0.3% cut in employers’ National Insurance contributions. Around £50 million
will be kept for energy efficiency demonstration schemes, information programs and
subsidised energy audits, while £100 million will be allocated for 100% first year ‘enhanced
capital allowances’ (ECAs) for investments in specific energy efficient technologies.  These
are discussed further in section 3.8.
The CCL was introduced in April 2001 and currently there are no plans to increase the level
of the tax before 2010. The CCL is anticipated to lead to a 2MtC reduction in CO2 emissions
‘including the exemption for CHP and renewables’. The meaning of the latter phrase is
unclear, as CHP and renewables are also incentivised by a range of other government policies
(sections 4 & 5). The ECAs for energy efficiency investment and the financial support for
R&D are expected to contribute an additional 0.5MtC. The total figure of 2.5MtC/year
corresponds to 5.8% of emissions from fuel use that is subject to the full rate of the CCL rate
(i.e. excluding the CCL negotiated agreements, which are discussed further in section 5.5).
The uncertainty surrounding this estimate is illustrated by the fact that it is 33% greater than
an earlier estimate provided by the DETR, which was for a 30% higher CCL rate.
As with any tax, the ultimate environmental outcome of the CCL is uncertain and the
assumptions made regarding price elasticities & other factors may subsequently prove to be
incorrect. If emission reductions are less than expected, the government may consider
increasing the CCL rate.  This would be politically unpopular and would threaten the status of
the negotiated agreements. A second factor creating uncertainty about the future of the CCL
is the downstream treatment of electricity.  This is potentially incompatible with the upstream
treatment of electricity in the proposed EU emissions trading Directive (section 4.7), so the
future implementation of the EU Directive could lead to modifications to the CCL.
Additionality issues
The great majority of non-domestic buildings are eligible for the CCL, although there are a
number of exceptions (e.g. charities).  The CCL provides a price incentive to improve the
efficiency of heat and electricity use, but it provides no incentive for switching to low carbon
fuels. Since energy accounts for only ~1% of costs in a typical non-domestic building, the
price incentive is relatively small. While the CCL would improve the economics of energy
efficiency investment, there is strong evidence to suggest that many cost effective
investments in non-domestic buildings are neglected at current energy prices (Sorrell et al,
2000). Similarly, life cycle energy costs for new buildings are commonly neglected in favour
of minimising capital costs (Sorrell et al, 2000). In general, price incentives are only one
factor influencing investment in energy efficiency, so estimating the impact of the CCL on
investment & behaviour is fraught with difficulty.
The CCL will need to be included in any calculations of the economics of an individual
project in the non-domestic sector. If project baselines are to be used, incorporating
assumptions about future energy use and emissions from a non-domestic building, the impact
of the CCL will need to be included in the calculations.
Since CHP fuel and renewable electricity are exempt, the CCL provides an incentive to invest
in CHP and to purchase electricity from renewable sources. Built environment CHP projects
may potentially be eligible for crediting, and are discussed in the next section. But there
would appear to be no grounds for awarding credits to electricity consumers who switch to
renewable electricity.
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 3.7 Voluntary participants in UKETS cap and trade program
Instrument description
CO2 emissions from groups of non-domestic buildings may be included in the UKETS cap
and trade program. For example, both retail chains (Sainsburys, Somerfield) and hotel chains
(Whitbread Hotels) are among the 46 organisations that have completed the first stage of
entry into the scheme and will be bidding in the incentive auction.  The proportion of these
organisation’s CO2 emissions that are covered by the scheme will depend upon the contents
of their respective ‘source lists’ - where sources are defined to include both direct emissions
from fossil fuel combustion and indirect emissions from electricity consumption (DEFRA,
2001a). A proportion of emissions from buildings owned by the retail chains are already
covered by CCLAs through the inclusion of on-site bakeries. This suggests that Sainsburys
and Somerfield will have some emissions covered by the CCLAs, some by the cap & trade
scheme and possibly (depending upon the source lists) some included in neither.
Additionality issues
 Projects that affect emissions from sources that are covered by the cap & trade program are
ineligible for crediting. This rule is simple to apply.  But it may be the case that participants
in the cap & trade program have sources which are not covered by the program and for which
they may be interested in developing crediting projects.  For example, retail chains may want
to propose projects associated with transport and logistics (which are excluded from the cap
& trade scheme).  If this occurs, individual companies will be involved in more than one
component of the UKETS.  This, however, should have no influence on baseline or crediting
rules.
 3.8 Enhanced capital allowances (ECA) for investment in
qualifying energy efficient technologies
Instrument description
The ECA scheme forms part of the climate change levy package, and has a budget of £100
million/year funded from CCL revenues. It represents a form of tax relief (on profits) to
encourage investment in energy efficient technologies. The scheme builds on existing
provisions, under which businesses may obtain tax relief, in the form of capital allowances,
for their investment in machinery and plant. This relief is normally given at a rate of 25% a
year on the reducing balance basis, which means that 95% of the cost is relieved in 8 years.
Enhanced capital allowances enables businesses to take relief on the full cost in the first year.
The benefit is an improved cash flow for the business in the year in which the investment is
made, while having a neutral impact on overall tax revenue. ECAs have been used in the past
for certain types of investment, but this is the first time that they have been introduced to
support energy efficiency.
ECAs have been made available for investment in CHP, boilers, motors, variable speed
drives, lighting, refrigeration, pipe insulation materials and thermal screens, provided they
meet relevant, technology-specific energy efficiency criteria.  The criteria are reviewed
annually and other technologies may be added to this list in future. Suppliers of individual
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technologies must apply to have their products certified. Investment in buildings and
structures is excluded.
Additionality issues
Energy efficiency projects in the non-domestic building sector may be eligible for ECAs if
they include one or more of the above technologies. It is possible that not all applicants will
be able to obtain ECAs, as the program is limited by the total budget of £100 million/year.
Access to ECAs will enhance the financial attractiveness of energy efficiency project to
business, although it will not change the basic economics (capital costs versus savings in
energy costs).  It may therefore be a relevant factor to be taken into consideration when
assessing project economics. Similarly, the availability or otherwise of ECAs may be a
relevant factor when determining a counterfactual baseline for the overall emissions from one
or more non-domestic buildings.
 3.9 Capital investment in public sector building/refurbishment
projects
Instrument description
Capital investment in new buildings and refurbishment is likely to be the major source of
energy efficiency improvement in non-domestic buildings.  These are not dedicated energy
efficiency projects, but general new build/refurbishment in which different standards of
energy efficiency are possible.  In the public sector, such projects will increasingly be subject
to guidelines and (non-binding) targets on energy efficiency performance.  Current initiatives
include: specific guidance on the energy efficiency of new schools; action to promote the use
of low energy design principles in capital projects in higher education; development of
guidance to ensure that energy efficiency is included in specifications for PFI projects; and
tailoring environmental assessment tools for non-domestic buildings (i.e. the BREEAM
software developed by the Building Research Establishment), specifically to projects in the
NHS. At are more general level there is the generic guidance on Best Value and whole life
costing for public sector capital projects and procurement.
Additionality issues
Capital projects in the public sector that go significantly beyond typical practice may wish to
apply for credits. In this case, it may be necessary to assess whether and to what extent the
existing general or sector specific guidance for such projects either requires or encourages
this level of performance. For example, a specific BREEAM rating may be specified in the
guidance for new NHS hospitals and this may go beyond the minimum standards required by
the building regulations. While such standards are not mandatory, they may be relevant to the
determination of the baseline. It may be reasonable to assume that the baseline performance
of capital projects in the public sector should be higher than the minimum standards required
by the building regulations.  Against this, the guidelines for public sector capital projects are
typically non-prescriptive and qualitative and vary widely between individual subsectors.
Furthermore, the guidelines are frequently not applied (incentives to minimise capital cost
tend to dominate).
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 3.10 Revised building regulations
Instrument description
New non-domestic buildings must conform to a wide range of regulations under the 1984
Building Act, including energy efficiency provisions (Part L).  The regulations were amended
in 2002 (DETR, 2000a) and allow for three broad methods for demonstrating compliance:
• Elemental method: This considers the performance of each aspect of the building
individually.  Areas addressed include: thermal performance of construction elements (U
values); air leakage; windows; solar gain; heating system efficiency (boilers & CHP);
heating controls; lighting; air conditioning systems; and so on.  Minimum standards must
been met in each area, although there is scope for limited trade-offs.
• Whole building method: This considers the overall performance of the building in terms
of carbon intensity (kgC/m2/year), and therefore allows for much greater flexibility in
meeting the standards. Standards based on EEBPp publications are given for naturally
ventilated, mechanically ventilated and air-conditioned office buildings.  School buildings
can comply if they conform to DfEE guidance on environmental design, while hospitals
can comply if they conform with NHS Estates guidelines (DETR, 2000a).  The method is
not yet suitable for other types of buildings.
• Carbon emissions calculation method: This also considers the performance of the whole
building, and can be applied to any building type. Designers must calculate the carbon
emissions from the proposed building, and demonstrate that these are equal to or less than
the carbon emissions from a reference building that meets the criteria of the elemental
method.  This requires the use of appropriate and certified software tools.
The regulations also extend to refurbishment (‘material alteration’) of non-domestic
buildings, although here the requirements are less strict, less comprehensive, open to
interpretation (e.g. ‘reasonable provision’), and maybe varied depending upon individual
circumstances (DETR, 2000a, p101).
The revised regulations come into force in 2002. They are expected to lead to a 25 to 30%
reduction in carbon emissions from new non-domestic buildings, and a total reduction in
carbon emissions from the non-domestic building stock of 0.31-0.32MtC/year by 2010
(approximately 1% of the non-domestic building total).  However, DETR has also published
proposals for future amendments of the energy efficiency provisions, which would come into
force after different intervals of time, but generally before 2010 (DETR, 2000a).  A
tightening of the regulations before 2010 is therefore very likely.
Additionality issues
The regulations set a floor for the energy efficiency performance of new and refurbished non-
domestic buildings. Individual projects that exceed these standards, may wish to use the
difference as a basis for applying for carbon credits. The relevant question here is: do the
building regulations provide an adequate baseline for crediting in the sector?  There are
grounds for questioning this. While the 2002 amendments go substantially beyond previous
requirements on energy efficiency, the UK remains some distance behind other European
countries in this area (although the disparity is more apparent for domestic buildings).
Furthermore, the required carbon intensities under the whole building method are based on
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‘typical’, rather than best practice values and are substantially higher than best practice in the
sector (e.g. 7.1kgC/m2/year for a new naturally ventilated office, compared to 2.3kgC/m2/year
for best practice). And, as indicated above, we may expect further tightening of the
regulations before 2010.
If the current building regulations are considered to be too lax a basis for crediting, some
additional guidelines will be required.  These may prove difficult to establish, given the
diversity of building types in the non-domestic sector.  The whole building method is largely
confined to offices at present, owing to inadequate data on carbon intensity for other building
types. Establishing standard carbon intensity (kgC/m2/year) benchmarks for the non-domestic
buildings sector will be problematic.
 3.11 EU Directive on the energy performance of buildings
Instrument description
The EU has proposed a Directive on the energy performance of buildings (CEC, 2000b).
This covers both domestic and non-domestic buildings, but industrial buildings are excluded3.
The Directive proposes the establishment of a general methodology for calculating the energy
performance of buildings, which may include a carbon intensity indicator.  The methodology
will be used as a basis for establishing minimum energy performance standards for new
buildings, which should be updated every five years to reflect technical progress. The level of
these standards is left to the discretion of Member States, and are likely to be based upon
existing national building regulations in the first instance. Hence, while the Directive may not
lead to a tightening of standards in the short term, it has the advantage of a common
methodology that will facilitate comparison between standards in different Member States,
and hopefully encourage convergence of standards in the longer term.
The proposed Directive also includes:
• A requirement for new buildings with a surface area >1000 m2 to investigate the technical
and economic feasibility of installing renewable generation, CHP or heat pumps and to
make the results available to stakeholders.
• Provisions to upgrade the energy performance of existing buildings which are undergoing
renovation. This only applies to buildings with a surface area >1000 m2 and where the
cost of the renovation exceeds 25% of the insured value of the building.  The upgrades
must be technically feasible and have a payback rate <8 years.
• A requirement for energy performance certificates to be made available to buyers of
tenants of buildings, when the building changes hands. These should include information
on current standards, best practice and recommendations for the improvement of energy
performance.  Public buildings are required to display their certificates.
The Directive proposes that member States transpose the Directive into domestic legislation
by December 2003. However, the Council of Ministers decided to allow Member States to
delay transposition to 2004 and full certification until 2008 if they lacked resources to carry
out energy audits. The final content and entry date of the Directive is therefore unclear.
                                                
3 The directive uses the ambiguous term ‘industrial sites’.
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In short term, the Directive seems unlikely to tighten the UK building regulations for new
domestic buildings, although a different approach may be required if a standardised
methodology is adopted.  Once in force, the Directive will require updates of the regulations
every five years and may lead to UK standards being brought more in line with those in
mainland Europe. The provisions on refurbishment go beyond current UK requirements, with
the explicit reference to measures with an 8 year payback. Similarly, the requirements of
renewables/CHP assessment for new buildings provides an additional incentive for these
technologies, although much will depend upon how (and by who) ‘economic feasibility’ is
interpreted (e.g. what rate of return is acceptable).
Additionality issues
For project crediting, the issues raised by the Directive are similar to those described for the
UK building regulations. The standards required for new buildings and major refurbishment
may be relevant to the development of project baselines in this sector. Similarly, the
requirement to assess renewable & CHP potential is relevant to the additionality of
renewables and CHP projects in new buildings.
 3.12 Summary: policy additionality for built environment
projects
Table 3.3 summarises the sectoral coverage of the policies discussed in this section.  In terms
of defining additionality, the most important policies are the Building Regulations and the
Climate Change Levy, since these are mandatory. The former requires certain minimum
standards to be achieved, while the latter provides an incentive for energy efficiency
investment by improving the rate of return. The ECAs do not change the basic economics of
an energy efficiency investment, but do make it more attractive by improving organisational
cash flow.
Most of the remaining policies are performance guidelines or voluntary targets taken on by an
organisation or a sector.  The relevance of these to additionality is much less clear.
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Table 3.3 Scope of particularly relevant policies in the built environment sector
Policy Year Public Commercial Industrial Notes
Voluntary energy efficiency
agreements
2001  Only applies to hotel sector at present.
Scope for expansion
Voluntary targets for public sector
buildings
To
2010
 Stringency varies between individual
subsectors
Making a Corporate Commitment
Campaign 2
2000    Open to organisations in each sector, but
limited take-up at present
Climate Change Levy 2001    Exemptions for oil, renewables & CHP fuel.
Some industrial buildings may fall within
CCLAs
Voluntary participation in the
UKETS cap & trade programme
2002   Some organisations have joined
Enhanced capital allowances for
energy efficiency investment
2001    Specific energy efficient technologies
eligible
Capital investment in public sector
building/refurbishment projects
Varies  Both general and sector specific guidelines
& targets
Revised building regulations 2002    Regulates energy performance of new and
refurbished buildings, but standards are
stricter for the former
EU Directive on the energy
performance of buildings
2004    Unlikely to lead to immediate changes to
UK regulations
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 4. Policies in the electricity generation area
Electricity generation occupies a critical position in any carbon emissions trading scheme.
Table 4.1 estimates CO2 emissions from electricity generation in 1999 to be 45.5MtC, or
approximately 30% of total UK CO2 emissions.
Table 4.1 The contribution of  electricity generation to UK carbon emissions
Elec Gen
(TWh)
Emission
factor
MtC/TWh
Carbon
emissions
MtC
Renewables 10.2 0 0
Nuclear 96.3 0 0
Gas 141.4 0.11 15.6
Coal 106.1 0.27 28.7
Oil 5.6 0.22 1.2
Total/av 359.5 0.13 45.5
Source: Based on DTI (2000).
In the UK climate program, these emissions are commonly attributed to the end user of the
electricity.  The alternative convention is to attribute generation emissions to the electricity
supply industry (ESI), and to assign only direct combustion emissions (from boilers etc.) to
industry, commerce and other consumers of electricity. This upstream/downstream treatment
is not merely an accounting convention.  It also relates to the treatment of electricity within
climate policy.  For example, the EUETS will require generators to obtain allowances to
cover all their carbon emissions – i.e. the generators take responsibility for ESI emissions.  In
contrast, the UKETS assigned allowances to industrial electricity consumers that cover both
direct emissions from fossil fuel combustion, and indirect emissions from electricity
consumption.  In this case, the consumer takes responsibility for ESI emissions. The
incompatibility between these two approaches is one of the biggest issues within UK climate
policy.
The electricity market is complex, involving the activities of generation, high-voltage
transmission, low voltage distribution and retail/supply (where the latter involves purchasing
electricity on the wholesale market and selling to consumers). This market is fully liberalised,
with competition at the wholesale and retail level, and with a wide range of companies being
involved in different aspects of the supply chain. Climate policy relevant to ESI emissions
may correspondingly affect a number of actors at different points on this chain (Figure 4.1).
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Figure 4.1 Target groups in the electricity supply industry
 4.1 Potential project types in the electricity generation area
There are a range of approaches to reducing emissions from the ESI:
• Reduce electricity demand: Aggregate demand depends upon electricity prices and the
actions of millions of electricity consumers. The generators influence on demand is
indirect, via prices. In a liberalised electricity market, generating companies seek to
expand market share and have an interest in increasing aggregate electricity demand.
• Reduce losses in transmission or distribution: This may result from improvement in the
physical network, or from locating the generator closer to the end consumer and
supplying electricity at a lower voltage level. The latter is commonly termed embedded
generation.
• Improve the efficiency of electricity generation: Individual generating plant may improve
efficiency, or more efficient plant may substitute for less efficient plant.
• Use lower carbon fuels: The primary example is the displacement of coal-fired generation
by gas fired CCGTs.  Alternatively, there may be scope for co-firing gas at existing coal-
fired stations.
• Use renewable generation: Displacement of fossil output by renewable electricity.  This
should be zero carbon, but activities that emit CO2, such as energy from waste, may count
as renewables in the UK. The UK has a target for 10% of electricity from renewable
sources by 2010.
• Use nuclear generation: Around one quarter of UK electricity is generated from nuclear
plant, with zero carbon emissions. The economics of new nuclear plant is very poor, and
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much existing nuclear plant is due for retiral.  However, life extension or efficiency
improvement of existing plant is a possible abatement option.
The relevant question is which type of project should qualify for crediting in this area?
Projects that reduce electricity demand are best considered under other headings, such as the
built environment.  Any such project will require assumptions about the carbon intensity of
the ESI when calculating the corresponding emission reductions.  If fixed conversion factors
are used, the assumed emission reduction is likely to differ from the actual emission
reduction, and the degree of disparity is likely to increase over time as the fuel mix in the ESI
changes.
Projects that reduce electricity demand are already incentivised by the CCL, the CCLAs the
cap & trade component of the UKETS and a host of other policies.  In contrast, supply side
projects that improve the efficiency of generation, use lower carbon fuels or use renewables
are not incentivised by these instruments.  Similarly, these instruments do not provide any
direct incentive to improve the efficiency of transmission or distribution systems. So it is for
these type of projects that project crediting arrangements could prove valuable.
 4.2 Policy influences in the electricity generation sector
Policies relevant to electricity generators fall into two categories. First, there are those
policies which directly affect generation plant, such as IPPC regulations on large combustion
plant.  Secondly, there are those policies which indirectly affect electricity generators, by
changing the demand for electricity. This includes the aggregate demand, the time profile of
demand (baseload/peak), or the demand for specific sources of electricity, most notably
renewables. A very wide range of policies fall into this second category, including the CCL
and the Renewables Obligation. In the case of the latter, the obligation to purchase renewable
electricity is placed upon electricity suppliers, but this creates a corresponding incentive to
invest in renewable generation.
Since electricity is normally fed into the national transmission network (or local distribution
networks) rather than being dedicated to individual consumers, aggregate changes in national
electricity demand will influence the economics of individual generation plant.  Similarly,
increases in output from one generating plant may lead to decreases in output from another
plant elsewhere in the country, with corresponding changes in emissions. These
considerations suggest that the system boundary issue is particularly problematic for
electricity generation projects.
The wide range of policies that indirectly affect generators by changing electricity demand
will not be discussed here. Instead, the focus will be on:
• measures that directly affect existing and planned generation plant; and
• measure that directly and indirectly encourage renewable electricity.
Those policies that are particularly important are:
• the Renewables Obligation,
• the New Electricity Trading Arrangements;
• the Integrated Pollution Prevention & Control (IPPC) Directive;
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• the proposed EU Emissions Trading Directive;
Table 4.2 classifies these and other policy measures, using our standard system.  The
following sections discuss a selection of these policies, identifying their implications for the
crediting scheme.  The IPPC Directive and the EUETS are introduced here, but these policies
are equally relevant to CHP projects and methane recovery projects which are discussed in
sections 5 & and 6.
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Table 4.2 Climate policy measures in the electricity generation area
 Broad category  Instrument type  Key policy instruments relevant to electricity generation
 Education,
information &
moral suasion
 Education, information
& moral suasion
• Energy Efficiency Best Practice Program
 Voluntary
approaches
 Unilateral commitments
 
  Public voluntary
schemes
• Making a Corporate Commitment Campaign
• Adoption of environmental management systems
  Negotiated agreements
 Economic
instruments
 Charge systems • CCL exemptions for renewable electricity
  Trading mechanisms • Proposed EU emissions trading directive
• Renewables Obligation
  Financial instruments • New Electricity Trading Arrangements
• Capital grants for offshore wind and energy crops
 Command and
control
 Framework based
standards
• IPPC Directive
  Performance based
standards
• Large Combustion Plant Directive
  Technology based
standards
• 
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 4.3 The Renewables Obligation
The Renewables Obligation places a statutory requirement on all suppliers of electricity to
demonstrate that a set percentage of their electricity sales has, effectively, come from a
renewable source. This is the key government policy instrument for supporting the market
penetration of renewables technologies. It replaces the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO)
scheme.
Instrument description
Timing and Objectives
The Renewables Obligation will come into effect in April 2002.4 The initial Obligation will
run for ten years, and sets percentage targets for renewable electricity supply that increase
annually (Table 4.3).
Table 4.3 The Renewables Obligation targets.
Period Estimated sales by
suppliers
Estimated total
obligation
Total obligation as %
of electricity sales
TWh TWh %
2001/02 310.9 - -
2002/03 313.6 9.4 3.0
2003/04 316.2 13.5 4.3
2004/05 318.7 15.6 4.9
2005/06 320.6 17.7 5.5
2006/07 321.4 21.5 6.7
2007/08 322.2 25.4 7.9
2008/09 323.0 29.4 9.1
2009/10 323.8 31.5 9.7
2010/11 324.3 33.6 10.4
2011/12 to 2026/27 - - 10.4
Source: DTI (2001, p.23)
Target groups
The primary target group is suppliers (retailers) of electricity. However, the obligations
placed on them are intended to help support generators of renewable electricity. The DTI has
specified which technologies it considers to be eligible sources of renewable electricity for
meeting supplier targets.
Operation
There are three ways an electricity supplier can comply with their obligation:
• Invest in renewable electricity generating capacity.
• Buy Renewables Obligation Certificates (ROCs) from other renewables generators.
• Pay a Buyout Price (effectively a fine). The Buyout Price will be set initially at £30/MWh
(i.e. around €48/MWh) and will be index linked. Revenues from suppliers paying the
Buyout Price will be recycled to suppliers that are in compliance in proportion to the
quantity of renewable power they have purchased (‘smearback’). Use of the buyout
prince thereby creates an effective subsidy to competitors.
                                                
4 The draft Statutory Instrument can be found on the web
at:http://www.hmso.gov.uk/si/si2002/draft/20029337.htm
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While the Renewables Obligation requires a certain volume of renewable electricity, the cost
of meeting this target is capped by the buyout price.  If suppliers choose to pay the buyout
price, the aggregate target may not been met.
Sales of ROCs can be separate to the sale of electricity. The plan is for a market in ROCs to
develop. Revenues from this ROC market will help renewables generators towards the
income they need (over and above the market price of electricity) in order to be viable.
The government has specified which types of renewable project are eligible to receive ROCs.
Generators with the following technologies will receive a ROC for every 1 MWh of
electricity they generate:
• Landfill gas;
• Sewage gas;
• Energy from waste – only non-fossil derived energy;
• Hydro – all small hydro (i.e. <20MW DNC) and only large hydro commissioned after
2001 (i.e. >20MW DNC);
• Onshore wind;
• Offshore wind;
• Biomass (with certain date and type restrictions);
• Geothermal power;
• Tidal and tidal stream power;
• Wave power;
• Photovoltaics;
• Energy crops.
Thus any projects falling into the above categories will be eligible for ROCs under this policy
instrument.
Additionality issues
The Renewables Obligation encourages renewables projects, but does not require baseline
setting.  However, the policy creates an effective business as usual baseline for the aggregate
development of renewables in the UK over the next ten years. It is only if all suppliers have
met their targets at the end of the compliance period that an individual renewables project can
be considered additional to the UK business as usual.  Also, the aggregate target is increased
yearly until 2010.  At present, the government has made no commitment to a renewables
target beyond 2010, but following the recent Cabinet Office Energy Review (PIU, 2002), it is
very likely that a 20% target will be set for 2020.
Renewables project developers can receive revenues from the ROC market to support their
project. Moreover, the government has stated that it will allow individual suppliers who over-
comply with their Renewables Obligation to convert that over-compliance into carbon credits
for sale into the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) (DEFRA, 2001, p.38). Note that they may
do this even if suppliers as a whole have not met their targets – i.e. even if the UK has less
renewable capacity than required in the Obligation. The baseline for this credit creation is
therefore at the supplier level, not the project or UK level.
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In making this conversion, the same standard conversion factor as used for Climate Change
Levy Agreements will be used. Suppliers can convert each kWh over-compliance to 0.43kg
CO2 mitigated. How the certificates will be issued remains unclear. It is of vital importance in
cases where the supplier is over-complying due to direct investment in renewable generating
capacity of their own. Clear certification rules are required which prevent the over-complying
capacity from creating both ROCs and carbon credits. If this dual certification of over-
compliance benefits arose it will create double counting problems.
The ROCs can be sold to other electricity suppliers (without their own renewables capacity)
to help them meet their compliance target under the Renewables Obligation scheme, and
hence contribute to the overall GHG mitigation expected from the Renewables Obligation
scheme. At the same time, under this dual certification scenario, the same over-compliance
would be creating carbon certificates for sale into the ETS – where the GHG mitigation from
over-compliance would again be counted, but this time to offset carbon emissions by the
certificate purchaser. GHG mitigation will then be counted twice and the project developer
(electricity supplier) receives two income streams by over-complying. In order to avoid such
double counting, over-complying renewables capacity should be issued either ROCS or
carbon certificates but not both for the same MWh.
The above suggests that qualifying renewables projects can earn ROCs, and in some cases
can earn carbon credits as well, but not both for the same MWh. The process by which the
latter are created is different from the arrangements under the project scheme and relies on a
supplier baseline rather than a project baseline or a UK aggregate baseline.  This means that
qualifying renewables projects are unlikely to be candidates for the creation of separate
project credits under the project scheme, as this would merely compound the problems of
double counting.
One possible exception to this could be if a developer decided that project credits offered a
more profitable revenue stream than ROCs. The economics of renewable generation makes
this unlikely - for example, the buyout price corresponds to approximately £70/t CO2 which
is likely to be higher than the anticipated price of carbon credits. But the fact that this is
unlikely, should not mean that it is ruled out in principle.  This means that a decision needs to
be made on the potential eligibility of all types of renewables projects.
If this route was chosen, the system boundary for the baseline becomes an issue.  For
example, should a renewables project be awarded credits when the UK as a whole has less
renewables capacity than required under the Obligation?  And what would happen if,
subsequent to a renewables project being awarded credits, the UK renewables target was
tightened? These questions go beyond the project crediting scheme and have implications for
UK energy policy as a whole.  They therefore need to be resolved in discussion with the DTI
and other relevant parties.
 4.4 Capital grants support for renewables
Instrument description
The government has announced financial support towards the capital costs of some types of
renewable project. The whole capital grants funding system is evolving and still taking shape.
Three types of renewable technology will receive funding: offshore wind; energy crops; and
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photovoltaics. The precise totals for grants going to each technology is confused. A survey in
2001 suggested support would amount to £250 million over the next three years, including:
• £100m for wind, solar and wave power announced by Tony Blair in March 2001;
• £50m from National Lottery funds, mainly for offshore wind and energy crops;
• £55.5m for the Government’s renewable energy research and development programme
from the DTI;
• £39m support for offshore wind announced by Tony Blair in October 2000 from the DTI;
and
• £12m in grants for planting energy crops from DEFRA (Hertin et al, 2001, p.4).
Photovoltaic plans are least developed, but discussions seem to suggest 50 per cent capital
grants will be available for some roof-top photovoltaic systems in public, commercial and
domestic buildings.
Details of support for offshore wind projects are more developed. A total of £39 million is
currently available from the DTI.5 At least another £10 million will be available through the
New Opportunities Fund scheme for redistributing Lottery money. This money will be used
to fund 40 per cent of eligible costs (with a £10 million limit) on selected projects. There will
be three application rounds. The first deadline for applications was January 2002. The second
will be December 2002, and the third deadline is June 2003.
Energy crop projects will be able to bid for £33 million capital grants under the New
Opportunities Fund. The New Opportunities Funds also has £10 million to help fund small-
scale biomass/CHP projects. New Opportunities Funds must be committed to projects by
2005.6
Additionality issues
Renewables projects in the above categories may therefore be able to obtain direct subsidy
from the government.  In addition, all projects will contribute to the government’s Renewable
Obligation targets and hence will be eligible for ROCs as described above.  These two
reinforcing sources of policy encouragement make such projects unlikely candidates for
carbon crediting.
 4.5 The New Electricity Trading Arrangements
The New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) were introduced in 2001, and replace the
previous arrangements under the Pool. In principle, NETA should have a neutral impact on
the carbon intensity of generation, but in practice they have had a negative impact.  The
reasons for this will be briefly identified below.
Instrument description
Under NETA, electricity trading is placed upon bilateral contract between generators,
suppliers, traders and customers.  There are three elements:
                                                
5 See http://www.dti.gov.uk/renew/eoi.htm
6 See http://www.nof.org.uk/index.cfm?loc=env&inc=energy
34
• The majority of electricity is traded on forward and futures markets, which allow
contracts to be struck up to several years ahead.
• Small volumes of electricity are traded via short-term power exchanges, which give
participants the opportunity to fine-tune their contract positions.
• A balancing mechanism is used to ensure that supply and demand is balanced in real-
time.
To assess the likely physical balance on the system, the system operator (SO) asks
participants to notify their expected generation & metered demand for each half-hour trading
period (Participants here include generators, suppliers and customers). The SO then accepts
bids for and offers of electricity to ensure that the system is balanced.  The position of all
participants is assessed to determine whether there metered output or consumption of
electricity matches their contracted position.  If not, they will be ‘out of balance’ and will
either receive lower prices for their electricity or incur costs.
Existing renewables generators have reported problems arising from NETA (Bathurst and
Strbac, 2001).  The balancing mechanism under NETA penalises generators who do not
honour their advance contract commitments. NETA participants who wish to avoid such
exposure must know with a high degree of certainty the amount of electricity they will be
producing in the future and that this is in balance with the electricity they have contracted to
supply for every half hour period. Given the stochastic nature of many renewable sources of
energy, especially wind, it is difficult for renewables generators to predict their output with
precision.  The same applies to certain types of CHP plant, where demand is uncertain. This
disadvantages intermittent renewables & CHP operators under NETA. However, in
introducing NETA a number of measures were put in place to assist such generators:
1. They could contract directly with local suppliers, thereby by-passing NETA arrangements
and penalties.
2. They could consolidate any imbalance between their contracted position and electricity
generated with the imbalances of other generators – the assumption being that some would
be in surplus and others in deficit such that their consolidated imbalance was less than any
individual imbalance.
3. They could trade into the Balancing Mechanism.
OFGEM have been monitoring the impact of NETA on smaller generators (including
renewables) following a request from the Energy Secretary in February. OFGEM reported to
the DTI at the end of August (OFGEM, 2001). OFGEM found that:
• very few small generators have joined the Balancing Mechanism;
• utilisation of consolidation measures has been very small and the measures on offer are
perceived by small generators to be unsatisfactory;
• earnings were down considerably compared to last year (down 26% for renewables - 27%
for wind); and
• the output of smaller generators has fallen substantially on last year (down 7% for
renewables - 13% for wind).
OFGEM concludes “it is too soon to say whether smaller generators generally are more
adversely affected than larger ones”(OFGEM, 2001, p.17). However, elsewhere OFGEM
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recommends: “With lower prices for green energy, as for all energy, the Government may
need to review whether targets can be met within current levels of subsidy and, in particular,
the need for additional Government support for less reliable green energy”. (OFGEM, 2001b)
OFGEM’s views on NETA may be too sanguine.  Many industry observers consider that
there is sufficient evidence that NETA is disadvantaging renewables and undermining their
position in electricity markets. Certainly NETA was not set up to provide a positive boost to
renewables capacity, which is intended to come from the Renewables Obligation. If NETA is
undermining the incentives for renewables generation offered by the RO, as now seems
probable, NETA may need to be revised.
Additionality issues
The impact of NETA on the economics of intermittent generation will need to be considered
when developing baselines. Possible revisions to the current framework should also be taken
into account.  In practice, NETA is one of three factors inhibiting the growth of renewables in
the UK and threatening achievement of the 10% target under the renewables obligation.  The
other factors are the difficulty many renewables face in obtaining planning permission
(particularly wind power) and the inadequate rewards for embedded generation in the pricing
and regulation of electricity networks.  These issues are discussed more fully in Ekins et al
(2001).
 4.6 Integrated pollution prevention and control
The Pollution Prevention and Control regulations implement the 1996 Integrated Pollution
Prevention and Control Directive (IPPC) and largely replace the Integrated Pollution Control
(IPC) Regulations from 1996. Their primary purpose of IPPC is to require the use of the Best
Available Techniques (BAT) to prevent and control pollution from specified types of
industrial installation. Large Combustion Plant (LCP), defined as combustion plant with a
thermal input greater than 50MW, are amongst the regulated installations.  All UK power
stations fall into this category.
The IPPC regulations require installations to use energy efficiently. It is in this sense that
IPPC may require operators to improve the operational efficiency of power stations. IPPC is
thus highly relevant to projects at existing and new UK power stations as well as projects in a
wide range of other industrial sectors (Table 4.4).
Instrument description
The IPPC regulations are currently being phased in sector by sector, as indicated in Table 4.4.
Power stations will come under the IPPC regulatory ambit in 2006. They are already
regulated under IPC. Although IPC does not have the specific energy efficiency requirement
of IPPC, it does require the use of similar BAT criteria to prevent and control pollution.
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Table 4.4 Proposed introduction of IPPC installations
Sector 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Paper/pulp *
Steel *
Textiles *
Tanneries *
Cement & lime *
Ferrous metals *
Non-ferrous *
Glass *
Chloralkali *
Foundries *
Organics *
Food and milk *
Poultry *
Asbestos *
Ceramics *
Polymers *
Inorganics *
Slaughterhouses *
Metal surfaces *
Landfills *
Pigs *
Incineration *
Waste recovery *
Batch organics *
Gas/liquification *
Coating activity *
Speciality chems *
Refineries *
Large combustion plant *
Coal liquefaction *
Note: Relates to installations requiring Part A1 permits only.
Source: DETR (1999, pp.20-21)
IPPC requires operators of installations to apply for an permit to operate their plant. The
application must demonstrate that the operator is pursuing BAT standards relevant to their
circumstances. The permit will set conditions of operation for the installation. These
conditions are based upon the application information and subsequent negotiations between
the regulator and installation operator. Determining BAT projects for each power station is
devolved to negotiations between the individual pollution inspector (at the Environment
Agency) and the operator of the power station (Smith, 1997; Fineman, 1998; Sorrell, 2002). It
is feasible that projects to improve generating efficiency, or even switch fuels, could be topics
of negotiation.
It is important to note that IPPC does not regulate CO2 directly. Instead, energy efficiency
forms one of the general obligations on operators (Article 3), and represents one of the
considerations to be taken into account when determining BAT (Annex IV). CO2 is not listed
in Annex III as one of the substances for which emission limit values are particularly
applicable (Article 2(6)). In addition, the Article 3 requirements are ambiguous. The first
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paragraph requires authorities to ‘ensure that installations are operated in such a way that....
energy is used efficiently’. But the second paragraph weakens this by stating ‘...it shall be
sufficient if Member States ensure that the competent authorities take account of the general
principles set out in this Article....’. A strict interpretation could be that the Article requires
standards for the amount of energy used, while a loose interpretation merely requires
authorities to ensure that pollution abatement does not lead to excessive energy use.  This
ambiguity in IPPC requirements creates some leeway in combining IPPC with carbon
emissions trading schemes.
In contrast to CO2, the other five GHGs are regulated directly under IPPC and hence are
subject to strict BAT requirements. At least three of the gases have a broader range of
environmental effects, including local air pollution, which means that site specific
determinations of BAT are more important.  In addition, while control of CO2 requires the
improvement of energy efficiency throughout the installation, control of the other five gases
is typically linked much more closely to individual processes. This should make it much
easier to specify BAT for these gases than for CO2. A consequence of this is that it is more
difficult to include these other gases in an emissions trading scheme.
In interpreting IPPC requirements, regulators can refer to BAT Reference Documents (called
BREF Notes) that have been developed by the European Commission’s IPPC Bureau in
Sevilla, Spain. The production of BREFs is ongoing and aimed at disseminating good
practice and technology performance data rather than setting BAT standards. The draft BREF
for large combustion plant has specific sections discussing energy efficiency and fuel
switching options to reduce GHG emissions.7 BREFS can inform negotiations between
regulator and regulated, but the final decision is in the hands of the site regulator (i.e. IPPC is
site-specific). Permit conditions may include projects to improve the energy efficiency of
electricity generation or other operations relating to the large combustion plant installation.
Additionality issues
Clearly, IPPC has the potential to drive energy efficiency improvements in large combustion
plant such as power stations. As such, it must be considered in any baseline or additionality
guidelines for projects affecting LCP in the electricity generation sector.  For example, the
great majority of the projects identified by Mott MacDonald (2001) in a recent study of the
electricity generation sector relate to highly cost effective efficiency improvements within
existing power stations. An important question here is what proportion of these projects
should be considered as being required (business as usual) under IPPC. The requirements
imposed under the previous IPC regime are not necessarily a guide here, as unlike IPPC this
did not have any requirements on energy efficiency.
The Environment Agency has recently produced a ‘Horizontal Guidance Note’ setting out
general guidelines for the interpretation of energy efficiency requirements under IPPC
(Environment Agency, 2001). This indicates that the Agency will not be using emission
limits for energy efficiency, but will instead be seeking ‘equivalent technical measures’.
Under this guidance, all UK IPPC all installations will be required to meet ‘basic energy
requirements’, which are not intended to be stringent. Installations will be expected to go
beyond these basic requirements, but in two different ways:
                                                
7 The draft BREF can be found at: http://eippcb.jrc.es/pages/Fmembers.htm
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• Those installations that are participating in a CCLA (section 5.5) or in the cap & trade
part of the UKETS will not have to demonstrate any further energy efficiency measures
under IPPC. This is because it is assumed that the incentives and penalties created by the
CCLAs & UKETS will themselves deliver such further measures.
• Those installations not participating in the other policy instrument will be required to
pursue further permit-specific energy efficiency requirements, negotiated with the
Environment Agency Inspector. Power stations fall into this second category as they are
not covered by the CCLAs or the UKETS.
The economic criteria proposed by the Agency for determining these permit specific
measures are vague:
‘The assessment of BAT should not be constrained by whether pollution control techniques result
in a net cost saving over their life of operation. It is perfectly valid to consider techniques which
result in a positive annual cost. One would expect to spend money to reduce other pollutants and it
is reasonable to expect, if necessary, to spend money to reduce pollutants from energy use.
However, there is insufficient data at present to confirm an appropriate figure for the net cost up to
which it would be reasonable to implement energy efficiency measures. The Regulators therefore
intend to review the setting of an appropriate cost benchmark in the future, in the light of
information arising from the Government’s Climate Change Agreements and Emissions Trading
mechanisms. At present there are ample measures that can be taken in most sectors if a benchmark
of zero cost is used to determine which techniques should be implemented.’ (Environment Agency,
2000: 30)
As described in section 5.5, if this guidance is to accord with government policy on CCLAs,
then payback periods in the region of two to four years will be deemed suitable criteria for
determining technical measures (even though the Agency, in principle, believes companies
should be prepared to pay a positive net present value for some energy efficiency activities).
The interpretation of the IPPC energy efficiency requirements thus hinges on: a) the future
evolution of guidance from the Agency; and b)  the manner in which this guidance is
interpreted by individual Agency inspectors for particular installations. As a result, there is
considerable uncertainty over whether energy efficiency projects at power stations (such as
the bulk of those identified by Mott MacDonald) will be eligible for project crediting.
This situation is complicated further by the fact that power stations are proposed to be
brought within the EUETS (described in section 4.7).  In developing this Directive, the
Commission has recognised that there are potential conflicts between emissions trading and
the energy efficiency requirements under IPPC. In a recent ‘non-paper’ (CEC, 2002) on the
interpretation of IPPC, it clarified that the energy efficiency requirements should only
provide a ‘baseline’, or ‘bottom line standard’, thereby giving scope for installations to
participate in carbon trading. The Commission’s interpretation of the energy efficiency
requirements therefore parallels that of the Environment Agency, although it still leaves open
how ‘baseline’ will be interpreted.  However, there is an important difference. At present in
the UK, power stations are regulated by IPPC but not by the UKETS, and hence have to fulfil
the Agency’s permit-specific requirements. If and when the generators are brought into an EU
wide trading scheme, the power stations will only have to fulfil baseline requirements.
Whether and when this transition will take place is subject to much uncertainty.
In summary, crediting projects that improve the energy efficiency of power stations are
subject to two key uncertainties:
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• Whether these measures would have been required anyway under the permit-specific
energy efficiency requirements of IPPC; and
• Whether the power station will subsequently enter the EUETS, and hence: i) require
allowances for its CO2 emissions; and ii) be subject solely to ‘baseline’ energy efficiency
requirements under IPPC
The importance of the energy efficiency requirements will depend upon the guidance and
interpretation made by the European Commission, the UK Environment Agency and
individual Agency Inspectors.  The importance of the EUETS goes much wider. This is the
topic of the next section.
 4.7 The EU emissions trading scheme
The proposed EU emissions trading directive (CEC, 2001) is of fundamental importance to
both the project crediting scheme and broader UK climate policy.  This is because there are
serious incompatibilities between the EU proposals and the existing UK framework - notably
the CCL, CCLAs and UKETS. The following summarise the key feature of the Directive, and
then highlights some implications.
Instrument description
Timing
The proposed Directive defines the core elements of a common EU trading scheme, which
will begin operation in 2005. But many of the design details are left to either subsequent EU
regulations, or to the discretion of individual Member States. Also, delays and changes are
likely before the Directive becomes law, which leaves considerable uncertainty over both the
timing and the eventual shape of the scheme.  The Directive proposes a split between a looser
scheme for the period 2005-2008, with significant subsidiarity, and a post-2008 scheme that
is significantly more harmonised.
Scope
The EU proposal is for a downstream cap & trade scheme targeted on major energy users.
The generators will be included in the scheme via an upstream treatment of electricity – i.e.
generators will need to obtain allowances for the fuel that they use.
The Directive applies to installations. This is based on IPPC definitions, but includes some
sites not covered by IPCC (e.g. combustion plant of 20-50MW thermal input), and excludes
some sites that are covered by IPPC (e.g. chemicals sector & waste incineration). The
sectoral coverage is summarised in Table 4.5.
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Table 4.5 Sectoral coverage of the EUETS Directive
Sector Activities
Energy Combustion plant >20MW, excluding waste incineration
Oil refineries
Coke ovens
Ferrous metals Metal ore roasting or sintering
Iron & steel production (including casting) with capacity >2.5tonnes/hr
Mineral Cement production in kilns with capacity >500t/day
Lime production in kilns with capacity >500t/day
Glass & glass fibre production with melting capacity > 20t/day
Ceramic production with capacity > 75t/day, or kiln capacity >4m3
Other Pulp from timber production
Paper & board with production > 20t/day
Participation is mandatory in the current draft.  Earlier drafts allowed for the exclusion of
certain installations provided they made ‘equivalent effort’.  This was specifically included to
allow for national initiatives such as the UKETS, but has now been dropped. This point is the
subject of controversy and opposition – not least from the UK.
Objectives
The Directive is confined to CO2 in the pre-2008 phase on the grounds of monitoring
uncertainties for other GHGs. Inclusion of other GHGs will require an amendment.
The Directive does not include a quantitative targets for GHG emissions reduction. Decisions
on the total quantity of allowances to be issued are left to individual Member States. This is
subject to the criteria set out in Annex III on national allocation plans. This includes
consistency with:
• Member State obligations, under the Kyoto Protocol;
• the technological potential of installations to reduce emissions;
• assessments of actual and projected progress towards fulfilling Community commitments;
and
• other EU legislative and policy instruments.
The last includes a requirement that no allowances should be allocated to cover emissions
which would be reduced or eliminated as a consequence of EU legislation on renewables.
Account should also be taken of unavoidable increases in emissions resulting from new
legislative requirements.
The total quantity of allowances should ensure that the overall emissions of all the
participating installations collectively would not be higher than if the emissions were to be
regulated under IPPC (Article 13). For non-CO2 GHG gases this means an aggregate level of
emissions related to BAT (trading means some installations will under-comply with BAT
while others can over-comply). For CO2 the situation is more ambiguous since BAT does not
apply under the IPPC Directive (section 4.6).
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Operation
Eligible installations are obliged to obtain a GHG emissions permit. This imposes a range of
requirements, including the requirement to surrender a sufficient no. of GHG allowances
each year to cover actual emissions of CO2. The GHG permit must be co-ordinated with
authorisations under IPPC.
Allowances are freely tradable within the EU, and are only valid for the period in which they
are issued (i.e. initial three year period, or subsequent five-year periods) Allowances are
cancelled three months after the beginning of the subsequent period. Banking between
periods is achieved through issuing new allowances to replace them.
Unrestricted banking is allowed from one year to the next in the initial three year period
(2005-2007), and from one year to the next in the subsequent five-year commitment periods
(2008-2012 and subsequently).  Member States to have discretion over whether to allow
banking from the initial three year period into the first commitment period.  As from 2008,
Member States must allow banking from one commitment period to the next.  These
conditions apply regardless of whether the Member State is in compliance with its Kyoto
obligations (i.e. an entity can bank a surplus even if MS as a whole is non-compliant).
In the initial period (2005-2007) all allowances are allocated free.. The Commission is to
specify a harmonised method for allocation for the period beginning 2008. Pre 2008, the
allocation method is at the discretion of Member States, who must publish and submit a
national allocation plan, stating the total quantity of allowances and how they propose to
allocate them.  The plan must be based upon objective and transparent criteria that must be
approved by the Commission. The criteria for distributing allowances between installations
include:
• comply with State Aid provisions (each situation examined on its merits);
• be consistent with technological potential of installations to reduce emissions;
• take account of unavoidable increases in emissions resulting from new legislative
requirements;
• not discriminate between companies or sectors in such a way is to unduly favour certain
undertakings or activities;
• no installation to be allocated more allowances than it is likely to need;
• provide for comments to be expressed by the public, and arrange for due account to be
taken of these.
Compliance provisions fall into three categories:
• naming: publishing names of operators who are not in compliance;
• excess emissions penalty: pay a financial penalty for each tonne of emissions for which no
allowance was held.
• 2005-2007: the higher of €50 or twice the average market price in the period 31 Jan to
31 March of that year for allowances valid for emissions during in the previous year;
• 2008-2012: as above, but with €100.
• surrender allowances: surrender allowances equal to those excess emissions in the
following calendar year (note that no penalty factor is used).
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How stringent these prove to be depends upon the likely allowance prices. These, in turn, will
be influenced by total current GHG emissions from target groups and how these compare
with the level of total allowances MS will issue.
Interfaces
The Community (not individual Member States) may conclude agreements with third
countries to provide for their mutual recognition of allowances between the EU trading
scheme and the third party domestic trading scheme. The Commission will draw up the
necessary provisions to allow mutual recognition to take place.
The scheme is designed to be compatible with IET. The Directive implies that recognition of
PAAs from another country requires a similar bilateral agreement between the Community
and the other country.
The proposal does not allow the use of project based credits from JI & CDM, or of credits
from national project schemes (e.g. UK). The Commission believes that the eventual
inclusion of such credits is desirable, subject to the satisfactory resolution of issues regarding
environmental integrity. The Commission intends to make a separate proposal for an
instrument on the implementation of project based mechanisms in the EU.
Additionality issues
The fundamental problem created by the Directive is uncertainty - both for the future of the
UKETS and the future shape of the UK climate program.  This in turn will have implications
for the crediting program and the long-term validity of credits.  If the implications of the
EUETS are not addressed, developers will be dissuaded from proposing project schemes.
The biggest incompatibility between the UKETS and the EU directive relates to the treatment
of electricity. In the UKETS energy using organisations take on targets for carbon emissions
that include the indirect emissions from electricity generation. These are calculated using a
fixed emission factor out to 2010 that is the same as used in the CCLAs.  This in turn is based
on the average ESI carbon intensity in DTI energy projections, together with assumptions
about transmission losses. This framework provides an incentive for reducing electricity
consumption, but provides no incentive for reducing transmission/distribution losses or the
carbon intensity of generation.  Electricity generators are effectively excluded from
participating in the scheme.
In the EUETS, generators must obtain allowances for emissions from the fuel they use. This
provides a direct incentive to generators to switch to lower carbon fuels and renewables.  In
addition, it provides an indirect incentive (via prices) for consumers to reduce electricity
consumption. The cost of electricity supply will rise to reflect the cost of carbon abatement
and the net acquisition of any allowances. Businesses considering how much to reduce
electricity use, whether to substitute electricity for fossil fuels or whether to co-generate heat
and power on-site will then make their decisions based on: a) an electricity price which has
internalised the cost of carbon abatement; and b) the price of carbon allowances relating to
their on-site use of fossil fuel.
This implies that in the UK scheme, ‘ownership’ of the ESI emissions lies, at least to some
extent with the electricity consumers, while in the EU scheme ownership lies with the ESI.
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Running the two schemes in parallel is therefore very difficult, even if there is very limited
overlap in the industrial sites that each scheme affects.8
Replacement of the UKETS with the EUETS is also problematic, since the EUETS is also
potentially incompatible with both the CCL and the CCLAs.  The origin of the problem lies
with the CCL, which is an electricity tax. If the EUETS replaced the UKETS but the CCL
was left intact, electricity consumers would be paying twice for ESI carbon emissions - once
through the CCL, and once through any increase in electricity prices that result from ESI
participation in the EUETS.  That could be politically very difficult. The CCL could be
modified, but this would threaten the CCLAs which are based upon the CCL.  At the same
time, industrial participants in the EUETS are the same companies that are now participating
in the CCLAs. If the CCLAs were left unchanged, these companies would have two targets,
which is clearly absurd.  If the UKETS replaced the CCLAs, these companies would have to
accept an absolute cap instead of a relative baseline, which is politically very sensitive.
Without going into details, it is obvious that introducing the EU scheme is likely to require
modification to the whole structure of UK climate policy in the business sector – the future of
the UKETS is just one part of this.
The project scheme cannot escape these complexities, particularly if projects in the ESI are
considered.  Suppose a project involved co-firing natural gas at a coal-fired power station.
Reductions below the coal-fired baseline would generate credits.  But at some point in the
future, the station would become part of the EU scheme.  In this case, it would need to obtain
allowances for its CO2 emissions, with the allocation being measured from some historical
baseline, which may be before or after the introduction of co-firing.  We would then have the
complex situation of a single plant both requiring allowances and generating credits.  A range
of questions then arise, such as whether entry into the EU scheme should trigger a revision in
the baseline for the crediting scheme?  Alternatively, the entry into the EU scheme could
invalidate any further generation of credits.  But the second rule would effectively rule out
ESI projects, since entry into the EU scheme could occur as early as 2005 – leaving
practically no time for the generation of credits.
A second set of issues relates to the inclusion of credits in the EU scheme.  At present, this is
not allowed, but the Commission proposes to introduce a Directive on this topic at a later
date. If the EU rules are more stringent than rules developed earlier for the UK scheme, it is
possible that UK projects will not be allowed to sell their credits into the EU scheme. This is
because they would threaten the EU requirements for environmental integrity. But if the EU
scheme replaces the UK scheme, this means that UK projects will not be able to sell their
credits within the UK either. The likely outcome in this instance is that some or all of the
anticipated credits from individual UK projects would become invalid when the EU scheme
is introduced. Since the EU scheme could be introduced very soon, and well within the
crediting lifetime of most projects, this is a critically important issue.
In general, the linked nature of the proposed EU scheme means that it will be very difficult
for the project crediting rules in one country to be less stringent than the EU standard. To do
so would undermine the environmental integrity of the entire scheme. In contrast,
establishing project rules that are more stringent than the EU standard may be feasible,
although this would raise concerns about differential treatment and may conflict with internal
                                                
8 Most participants in the UKETS cap & trade scheme will not be included in the EUETS.  However, the CCLA
participants will.
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market rules.  The EU's preferred approach would be to have a standardised set of rules for
all Member States. This means that the UK project crediting rules will create a very important
precedent. Three broad scenarios are possible:
• the UK rules subsequently become the de-facto standard throughout the EU;
• the UK rules are more stringent than the subsequent EU rules, raising competitiveness
issues but probably not threatening the viability of individual projects; or
• the UK rules are less stringent than the subsequent EU rules, leading to the modification
of UK project baselines and to the disallowing of some or all of the anticipated project
credits.
Similar difficulties may arise in relation to early crediting. If a) banking of pre-2010 project
credits is allowed; and b) the project scheme is interfaced to either the UKETS or EUETS,
then banking would need to be allowed in the latter as well. This is because, even if you can
distinguish between project credits and ETS allowances, they could easily be swapped to
allow effective banking of allowances.  Similarly, if you interfaced the project scheme to the
ETS and didn't allow pre-period banking in the latter, then you wouldn't be able to bank any
project credits.
In summary, the complexities and uncertainties created by the EUETS seriously threaten the
viability of the project scheme.  These problems being particularly acute for projects in the
electricity generation sector. Some clarification of the UK's position towards the EUETS is
therefore essential.  Without this, the validity of the project scheme will be seriously
undermined and developers will be dissuaded from developing project proposals.
 4.8 Summary: policy additionality for electricity generation
projects
Table 4.6 indicates which of the four main options for reducing CO2 emissions in the sector is
incentivised by existing policies
Table 4.6 Scope of policy instruments particularly relevant to electricity generation sector
 Policy instrument  Year Tx & Dx
efficiency
 Generation
efficiency
 Fuel
switching
 Renewables
CCL exemptions for renewable
electricity
2001 
Renewables Obligation 2002 
Capital grants for renewables 2002 
IPPC Directive 1998  
New Electricity Trading
Arrangements
2001  
Proposed EU emissions trading
directive
2005   
Renewables projects are unlikely to be good candidates for crediting owing to the incentives
already created by the Renewables Obligation and other initiatives.  Projects that improve
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generation efficiency look much more promising, but here the key issue is the extent to which
they are likely to be required under IPPC.9
Projects that improve transmission and distribution efficiency are not incentivised by any of
the instruments discussed above, and hence look promising.  However, the management of
electricity transmission and distribution networks is a monopoly business and hence subject
to economic regulation by OFGEM. As a result, to assess the additionality of such projects, it
would be necessary to examine the complex requirements and incentives provided by
economic regulation.  This is beyond the scope of the present report.
The uncertainties created by the future implementation EUETS threaten the viability of all
projects within the electricity generation sector.  Unless clarification is obtained on this issue,
project developers will be dissuaded from putting forward proposals. This Directive is
therefore of fundamental importance to the future of the UK project scheme.
                                                
9 For an assessment of the economic potential of such projects, see Mott MacDonald (2001)
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 5. Policies in the CHP area
Combined heat and power (CHP) occupies a unique position at the intersection of: a)
environmental policy and competition policy; and b) energy supply policy and energy
demand policy.  By generating heat and electricity at very high efficiencies it offers an
attractive means of reducing energy use and CO2 emissions.  By providing an economic
means of small scale electricity generation it offers a promising route to increasing
competition in generation and supply.  From the point of view of the user, however, CHP is
primarily a means to reduce the cost of supplying heat and power.
The government has a target for 10GWe of CHP capacity by 2010. This compares to a
current capacity of 4.7GWe, estimates of a total potential in the public, commercial and
industrial sectors of 10-17GWe, and estimates of a potential of 2GWe for community
heating.  These estimates exclude other applications of CHP, such as micro-CHP in
households.  The average annual rate of commissioning CHP capacity over the past five years
was 250MWe, which needs to be doubled if the 10GW target is to be met (CHPA, 2001).
10GWe of CHP would lead to carbon savings of around 6MtC/year (CHPA, 2001).
The CHP target has a different status from the UK renewables target in that there is no
obligation on a target group to commission this capacity. Instead, there is a patchwork of
policies and incentives that hopefully together will deliver the 10GW outcome.  These are
intended to be brought together in an overall CHP strategy, but the publication of this has
been repeatedly delayed.  Moreover, the ordering and commissioning of new CHP capacity
has being brought almost completely to a halt as a result of increases in gas prices and the
introduction of NETA.  As described in section 4.5, the latter has disadvantaged small
generators with intermittent sales to the grid, including many existing CHP sites.
The projections in the UK climate program assume the achievement of the 10GW target,
while other projections, such as those from the DTI (2000) are less optimistic. There is a
double counting issue here for the projects scheme as any emission reductions from any CHP
projects will have already been included in the climate program.  Projects will only be
additional to the climate program if the 10GW target is exceeded. In practice, developing
more than 10GW is unlikely, and the projects scheme may provide a valuable additional
incentive for certain types of CHP investment.
 5.1 Potential project types in the CHP area
CHP projects may be viable in a wide range of sectors, including industry, public &
commercial buildings, the domestic sector, community heating, sewage treatment and landfill
sites. The CHP market is best categorised as follows:
• small scale systems:  based on gas-fired spark ignition engines up to around 1MW in size.
Most of the heat generated is in the form of hot water. These systems find their main
application in service sector applications, such as office blocks, hotels and leisure centres.
• small-medium sized industrial systems: based on gas turbines or compression ignition
diesel engines and fired on HFO or dual gas/gasoil. These also have a significant
proportion of heat in the form of hot water. Industrial systems range from about 1MWe
up to a few tens of MWe.  As well as industry, hospitals are a large market.
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• large industrial systems: based on traditional steam turbine technology or gas turbines,
with sizes from tens of megawatts and delivering process steam. The main sectors include
chemicals, iron and steel, paper, food and drink and oil refining. These account for the
bulk of UK CHP capacity. Steam turbines are driven by high-pressure boilers which can
use a variety of fuels, including non-commercial fuels.
• biofuel/waste fired CHP: This is a niche market, with a large number of schemes in
sewage treatment works.  Here, methane-rich sewage gas is burnt in engines, with the
heat used to maintain the temperature in the anaerobic digester and the electricity used
mainly to drive pumps and fans.  Other potential applications include landfill sites and the
incineration of municipal solid waste.
• community heating: This can be done either on a large scale (city-wide CHP, or district
heating) or at a smaller scale (the use of engines in blocks of flats).  The former can use a
range of technologies, while the latter normally employs small spark ignition engines.
Community heating has not developed extensively in the UK, in contrast to some parts of
continental Europe, partly as a consequence of the existing gas network for central
heating.  However, the use of CHP in blocks of flats is a growth area.
• micro-CHP: This covers the use of technologies at the level of the individual home or
within small blocks of flats. While gas engine CHP is technically possible, the main
interest is in new technologies such as Stirling engines and fuel cells.
The first four of these categories are relevant to the project scheme.  Community heating and
micro-CHP are largely excluded from the project scheme, since they relate to the domestic
sector.
CHP plants are normally sized to meet a portion of the heat load and to displace imported
electricity.  Since the heat to power ratio of the unit is commonly different from that from the
site, there may be a need both to import top-up electricity and to export surplus electricity.
Small CHP sites are rarely sized to export electricity, but some large sites may be significant
exporters. The economics of CHP investment depend upon a wide range of factors, but
particularly upon the number of hours operation in a year.  At current energy prices, CHP is
only economic at sites where there is 2-3 shift working for more than 5 days a week.  This
effectively rules out CHP for a large number of end use applications (e.g. commercial
offices).  Changes in energy prices, and in particular the differential between fuel and
electricity prices, may change this situation.
 5.2 Policy influences in the CHP area
Table 5.1 summarises the most important policy measures relevant to CHP, using our
standard classification system.  This table excludes  policies relevant to CHP projects in the
domestic sector – i.e. micro CHP and community heating.
Since CHP projects can be undertaken in a wide range of sectors, there are a correspondingly
diverse range of policy influences. The relevance of each policy in Table 5.1 will depend
upon the nature of the individual CHP project, including its size, the fuel used and the sector
in which it is located.  For example, CHP projects in the manufacturing sector are
incentivised by exceptions from the CCL, but CHP projects in the upstream energy industry
(e.g. oil refineries) are not. Similarly, CHP projects above 10MW need to obtain consent
from the DTI, while smaller projects do not. Overall, the picture is complex, with some
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potential projects having multiple policy influences and others having relatively few.  But in
no case would a potential CHP project be free of other policy influences.
The following sections discuss a selection of these policies, identifying where possible their
implications for CHP projects under the crediting scheme.  Only those policies which are
considered particularly relevant are discussed. Given both the unique nature of CHP and the
wide range of CHP project types, there is considerable overlap with the policies relevant to
the built environment, electricity generation and waste/methane areas.
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Table 5.1 Climate policy measures in the CHP area (excluding domestic sector and community heating)
 Broad category  Instrument type  Key instruments relevant to CHP area
 Education,
information &
moral suasion
 Education, information
& moral suasion
• Energy Efficiency Best Practice Program
 Voluntary
approaches
 Unilateral commitments
 
• Voluntary energy efficiency agreements (e.g. hotel sector)
• Voluntary targets for the government estate and other public sector
buildings
  Public voluntary
schemes
• Making a Corporate Commitment Campaign
  Negotiated agreements • CCLAs for energy intensive industry
 Economic
instruments
 Charge systems • CCL (fuel use for ‘good quality’ CHP is exempt)
  Trading mechanisms • Trading arrangements for CCLAs
• Voluntary participants in UKETS cap and trade program
• Proposed EU emissions trading directive
  Financial instruments • Enhanced capital allowances for investment in ‘good quality’ CHP (all
sectors)
• Exemption of CHP from business rates
• Capital investment in public sector building/refurbishment projects that
include CHP
 Command and
control
 Framework based
standards
• IPPC Directive - energy efficiency requirements
• LCP Directive – encouraging CHP for new plants
• Consents policy for new power stations
  Performance based
standards
• Revised building regulations Part L
• EU directive on the energy performance of buildings
  Technology based
standards
• Revised building regulations Part L
Note: Excludes policies relevant to the domestic sector, including community heating.
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 5.3 Voluntary energy efficiency agreements, voluntary targets in
the public sector and MACC
These policies and initiatives were discussed in the section 3.  In each case, CHP projects
may contribute towards the energy efficiency target for the site or sector. CHP is particularly
relevant to the hotel sector, and hence to the HCIMA agreement, since the high annual
occupancy of hotels makes many CHP projects viable.  The implications for individual
projects were highlighted in section 3.
 5.4 Climate Change Levy
Instrument description
The basic elements of the CCL were described in section 3.6.  The policy relevance to CHP is
that fuel used in ‘good quality’ CHP schemes is exempt from Levy.  The rules defining what
is meant by good quality are set out in detail in (DETR, 2000b) and relate primarily to
acceptable levels of heat and electrical efficiency (including a minimum electrical efficiency
of 20%).  The rules for CCL exemption require a rather artificial division of CHP fuel use
between that used for heat production and that used for electricity production. Fuel used for
heat production or for the generation of electricity that is used on site is exempt, but fuel used
for the generation of electricity that is exported to the distribution network is not exempt.
The rationale for this rule is questionable, as it would appear to penalise existing schemes that
export electricity, and discourage the optimal sizing of new CHP schemes.
Additionality issues
Any CHP project in a sector that is eligible for the CCL (i.e. projects in most of the public,
commercial and industrial sectors, but excluding upstream energy) will be incentivised by the
exemption from the CCL. This incentive must be factored in when calculating the economics
of the project and is very relevant to the determination of additionality.  One perspective
could be that no such projects should be eligible for credits as they already receive a strong
incentive. Another perspective could be that the additionality of such projects should be
considered on a case-by-case basis, considering the economics of the individual projects.  In
making this judgement, it needs to be recognised that CHP still faces numerous obstacles and
that there is considerable doubt as to whether the government's 10GW target will be
achieved.
 5.5 Negotiated agreements for energy intensive industry (CCLAs)
It is very unlikely that CHP projects at facilities that are signatories to a CCLA would also be
eligible for project credits.  But the basic elements of these agreements and the associated
trading arrangements are set out here for reference.
Instrument description: basic agreements
The CCLAs, which came into force on 1st April 2001, are negotiated agreements between
energy intensive companies and the government. The objective of the CCLAs is to cushion
energy intensive industries from the full impact of the CCL, while at the same time securing
quantified improvements in energy efficiency and thereby contributing to the UK carbon
targets. The agreements were negotiated on behalf of individual companies by the industry
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trade associations and contain legally binding targets denominated in either energy use
(GWh), energy intensity (GWh/unit of output), GHG emissions (MtC equivalent), or GHG
intensity (MtC/unit of output).  These targets are defined for two yearly intervals up to 2010.
Signatories to a CCLA are eligible for an 80% reduction on the Climate Change Levy (CCL).
CCLAs have been negotiated with 44 industrial sectors representing around 7000 industrial
installations . The government estimates that the CCLAs will reduce emissions of CO2 from
industrial installations by 2.5MtCe/year by 2010. This corresponds to a 12% reduction on the
current annual emissions of 20.8MtC from CCLA participants
The agreements are complex and vary from sector to sector in a number of respects,
including:
• baseline year: this can be any year from 1990 to 2000;
• absolute or relative targets: nearly all sectors have opted for relative targets (e.g. %
reduction in energy use per unit of output), with only the steel and aerospace sectors
agreeing to targets for absolute energy consumption.
• value of the targets: the percentage improvement over the baseline year varies widely
between sectors;
• risk management procedures: some sectors are allowed to adjust their targets if there are
changes in product mix or output level, while others have adopted a ‘tolerance band’.
The negotiation of the targets was based on a bottom up database of industrial energy
efficiency opportunities held by ETSU (ETSU, 2001). This distinguishes between
‘technically possible’ opportunities and ‘cost effective’ opportunities, where the latter
includes assumptions about investment criteria in different sectors.  In the majority of cases,
the target is based on a percentage of the cost effective opportunities, where the latter are
defined as investments with relatively short paybacks (e.g. 3 - 4 years). The targets also
include assumptions about the scope for CHP.
The CCLAs apply to energy intensive industry. For reasons of administrative simplicity, the
government chose to define energy intensive sectors as those sectors with installations
regulated under the IPPC Directive (this excludes LCP installations). IPPC covers the
majority of energy intensive sectors (e.g. aluminium, cement, ceramics, chemicals, food &
drink, foundries, glass, non-ferrous metals, paper, and steel), but not all IPPC installations are
energy intensive.  Hence, a number of non-energy intensive sectors have also negotiated a
CCLA.
 Installations regulated under IPPC are automatically eligible for a CCLA.  In addition, the
following installations are also eligible:
• Installations in ‘IPPC sectors’ that are below the below the IPPC size threshold.10  These
were required to be included in the CCLAs on the grounds of competition law, with the
result that even very small sites in ‘IPPC sectors’ are now covered by the CCLAs.
• Installations in a number of energy intensive sectors that lie outside IPPC, such as the
water industry.
                                                
10 With the exception of the 50 MW threshold for combustion plant.
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The entity regulated under a CCLA is termed a facility. The definition of a facility is based on
that for an installation, but is not identical to it. In many cases, the CCLA facility covers a
greater proportion of the energy use at the site than the IPPC installations.
Instrument description: trading in the CCLAs
The CCLAs were developed prior to the UKETS, but are now also included in the trading
scheme. The nature of their participation is described in detail in Sorrell (2001). CCLA
companies can generate ‘credits’ (not the same as project credits) by exceeding their
individual targets. These credits are generated ex post, when emissions are compared to the
milestone targets at two-year intervals.
Credits can be traded with other CCLA companies and also with companies in the cap &
trade scheme.  However, since most of the targets under the CCLAs are defined in terms of
energy intensity (unit targets) rather than carbon emissions (absolute targets), linking the
CCLA sector to the cap & trade sector is problematic as increases in output from the former
can lead to increases in total emissions, thereby violating the emissions cap. As a
consequence, trading by CCLA participants with relative targets is subject to restrictions to
prevent inflation in the total number of allowances. A ‘Gateway’ has been developed to
prevent a net transfer of allowances from the CCLA sector to the cap & trade sector.  There
are no restrictions on allowances sales in the other direction, and CCLA participants with
absolute targets are not subject to any restrictions.
The finer points of these arrangements are not relevant here (for details, see Sorrell 2001).
What is relevant is that the trading arrangements create an incentive for companies to exceed
their individual CCLA targets, and to generate credits for sale.  These ‘CCLA credits’ are
distinct from project credits, although the principle (baseline & credit) is the same.
Additionality issues
Whatever the nature of the target (absolute/relative, carbon/energy), companies that are
signatories to a CCLA may consider investment in CHP to help them meet their target –
although investing in CHP will not be the only way in which a target could be met.
Furthermore, under the agreements each operator is required to conduct an assessment of the
technical and economic feasibility of CHP on their site by September 2002.  If the studies
show that there is a cost-effective CHP opportunity, the government will review the targets
for the site.  Finally, the trading arrangements provide an additional incentive for CHP
investment to generate surplus credits. This suggests that, while the CCLAs do not absolutely
require CHP investment, they provide a very strong incentive for it.
The CCLAs may be an important stimulus to CHP. But since CHP investment at CCLA sites
is already incentivised by: a) legally binding targets; b) the trading arrangements; and c)
exemption from the remaining 20% of the CCL, there are no grounds for such projects being
eligible for additional project credits.  As with the cap & trade scheme, emissions covered by
the CCLAs should be outside the scope of the project scheme.
Looking at the combined influence of the CCL and CCLAs on CHP projects, it is useful to
distinguish:
• Projects in sectors outside the scope of the CCL (e.g. refineries).  Here, levy exemption
from the CCL delivers no benefit
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• Projects in sectors within the scope of the CCL, but not in CCLA.  Here CHP is already
incentivised by CCL exemption.
• Projects in sectors covered by a CCLA and undertaken in order to meet their targets.
Here CHP is already incentivised by the CCLA target.
• Projects in sectors covered by a CCLA and undertaken in order to exceed their targets.
Here CHP is already incentivised by exemption from the remaining 20% of the CCL and
by the scope for selling surplus credits.
The CCLAs do not cover all the carbon emissions at individual sites, and companies that are
participants to a CCLA may also have sites that are outside the agreements. Hence, it is
possible that participants in a CCLA may wish to invest in CHP and claim credits for projects
that are outside the scope of the agreements.
 5.6 Voluntary participants in UKETS cap and trade program
As with the CCLAs, voluntary participants in the & trade scheme are incentivised to invest in
CHP, both to meet their targets and to free up surplus allowances. And, as with the CCLAs,
these type of projects should not be eligible for project credits.
However, it may be the case that participants in the cap & trade program have sources which
are not covered by the program and for which they may be interested in developing crediting
projects. If this occurs, individual companies will be involved in more than one component of
the UKETS.
 5.7 Enhanced capital allowances for investment in ‘good quality’
CHP
Instrument description
The framework for ECAs was described in section 3.8. ‘Good quality’ CHP is eligible for
ECAs, in the same manner as it is eligible for exemption from the CCL.  The difference is
that this incentive applies to all CHP projects, regardless of type fuel and location. In
contrast, the CCL exemption only applies to those sectors and fuels that are eligible for the
CCL.
Additionality issues
As with energy efficiency projects in the non-domestic building sector, access to ECAs will
enhance the financial attractiveness of CHP to business because it changes their cash flow.  It
is important to note, however, that ECAs do not change the basic economics of a CHP project
which depends upon the ratio between capital costs and savings in energy costs.  ECAs may
nevertheless be a relevant factor to be taken into consideration when assessing project
economics and additionality.
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 5.8 IPPC Directive
Instrument description
The IPPC Directive was described in section 4.6.  There two ways in which this could be
relevant to CHP projects:
• Large combustion plant (>50MW thermal input): New large combustion plant (LCP), or
major revisions to existing LCP, will need to meet IPPC requirements, as interpreted by
the local Inspector. In some circumstances, the requirements could be interpreted as
requiring CHP.  Relevant LCP may include: a) industrial plant in sectors covered by the
CCL or CCLAs; b) industrial plant in upstream energy sectors outside the CCL/CCLAs
(e.g. oil refineries); c) electricity generation plant; d) large community heating schemes;
and e) landfill gas / methane recovery projects that exceed 50MW.
• Combustion plant in other IPPC sectors: Large sites in sectors such as chemicals are
regulated under IPPC, whether or not they contain LCP.  As described in section 4.6,
IPPC includes energy efficiency requirements for these sites, although this does not mean
strict BAT for energy efficiency. In some circumstances, the Inspector may interpret these
as requiring the site to invest in CHP (probably only when existing plant is replaced).
This situation is complicated in that the great majority of sites regulated under IPPC are
also included in the CCLAs.
Additionality issues
Both cases are problematic from the perspective of project credits.  In the first case, CHP may
be required by the Inspector, in which case there is no additionality. In the second case, CHP
may be required by the Inspector, and at the same time may be incentivised by CCL
exemptions and CCLA targets.  Neither situation looks promising for crediting projects.
 5.9 Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD)
CHP projects that qualify as large combustion plant are not only covered by IPPC but also by
the Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD) (CEC, 2001). Article 6 of this Directive
requires that, for new plants, the technical and economic feasibility of providing for CHP be
examined. The meaning of ‘feasibility’ is open to interpretation in individual circumstances
and in the UK this is likely to be the responsibility of the Environment Agency Inspector.
Hence for new LCP, the incentives for CHP investment created by IPPC are reinforced by
additional incentives from the LCPD.
 5.10 CHP in power station consents
Under Section 36 (power stations) of the Electricity Act 1989, consent is required from the
Secretary of State for Trade & Industry for the construction, extension or operation of any
generating station of over 50MWe.  Similarly, under section 14 (1) of the Energy Act 1976,
energy policy consent is required for power stations of 10 MW or more if they are fuelled by
oil or natural gas. The first of these is primarily relevant to power stations and to generating
plant on large, energy intensive industrial sites, while the second is relevant to a much wider
range of industrial generation.
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In both cases, developers are now required to seriously explore the opportunities for CHP,
rather than electricity only generation.  The relevant local heat load could be the host site,
neighbouring industrial sites or households via a community heating scheme.  Government
guidance on this recognises the CHP may often not be technically or economically practical,
but requires that it be explored.  The practical effect of this requirement will depend upon the
manner in which it is interpreted by the DTI - for example, what investment criteria should be
used to decide when a CHP project is uneconomic?
The assessment of CHP potential is therefore mandatory for the great majority of new
generating plant above 10MWe. This is a relevant consideration to take into account if a CHP
project of this size is applying for project credits.
 5.11 EU Directive on the energy performance of buildings
The EU Directive on the energy performance of buildings was described in section 3.11. One
way the Directive goes beyond existing UK building regulations is the requirement for new
buildings with a surface area >1000 m2 to investigate the technical and economic feasibility
of installing CHP.  The results should be made available to stakeholders. As with the IPPC,
LCPD and power station consents, the impact of this will depend upon how (and by who)
‘economic feasibility’ is interpreted.  The difference is that, whereas IPPC, the LCPD and
power station consents only apply to large industrial CHP installations, the EU Directive
applies to a much wider range of non-domestic buildings. This means that the incentive could
be very relevant to the additionality of CHP projects in non-domestic buildings.
 5.12 Summary: policy additionality for CHP projects
It is clear from the above that the policy incentives for CHP projects are numerous and
complex.  This creates difficulties for assessing the additionality of such projects.  Many CHP
projects, such as those located on sites covered by the CCLAs or the cap & trade scheme, will
not be eligible for project credits.  But the status of other projects, such as those at oil
refineries and other upstream energy plants, is more difficult to assess.
Table 5.2 attempts to summarise the sectoral coverage of different policies relevant to CHP,
distinguishing between broad sectors (e.g. energy industry) and subgroups within those
sectors (e.g. power stations). Any such table oversimplifies the coverage of each policy, but it
does provide a useful overview.  Three size threshold are also relevant:
• Large combustion plant: >50MW thermal input, which are regulated under the LCPD and
IPPC Directive;
• Power station consents: > 10MW electrical output, which need to obtain consent from the
Secretary of State; and
• Large buildings: >1000m2, which are required to investigate CHP potential under the EU
Directive on the energy performance of buildings.
Many of the incentives for CHP depend upon the site specific interpretation of various
regulatory requirements.  These include:
• Interpretation of IPPC and LCPD requirements by Environment Agency inspectors;
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• Interpretation of the requirements of the EU Directive on the energy performance of
buildings by local authorities and approved inspectors;
• Interpretation of the requirements of power station consents by the Secretary of State for
trade & industry.
In each case, the policy encourages CHP, but does not require it. In contrast, the CCL
provides an economic incentive for CHP investment by improving the rate of return. The
ECAs do not change the basic economics of CHP investment, but do make it more attractive
by improving organisational cash flow.
Two very promising areas - community heating and micro-CHP - are excluded from the
project scheme as they relate to the domestic sector.  As argued in Annex 1, this represents a
substantial missed opportunity.
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Table 5.2 Scope of particularly relevant policies in the CHP area
Sector Subgroup CCL CCLAs UKETS
cap &
trade
IPPC LCPD
(only if
>50MW)
ECAs EU
Buildings
Directive
Power
station
consents
Energy industry Power stations    Blds only 
Oil refineries    Blds only
Other    Blds only
Manufacturing CCLA companies      Blds only
UKETS cap & trade   Some  Blds only
Other  Some  Blds only
Public Buildings   
Commercial UKETS cap & trade    
Other   
Waste industry Landfill (CH4
recovery)
 Some 
Incineration  Some 
Domestic Community heating Some some 
Micro CHP  
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 6. Policies in the methane recovery area
Methane recovery and use as energy from landfill and mines are candidate projects. Both
types of projects reduce methane emissions, while producing CO2.  The methane could be
reduced by flaring, but greater environmental benefit is had through using the energy to
generate electricity and/or heat
Methane is generally generated by the biodegradable component of waste streams. Each year
the UK produces around 400 million tonnes of waste. Around 300 million tonnes of this is
aggregates, mining, sewage and sludge, construction and demolition waste. The remainder
consists of 48 million tonnes of industrial waste, 30 million tonnes of commercial waste and
28 million tonnes of municipal waste. Around 54% of commercial and industrial waste and
83% of municipal waste goes to landfill. In total, 58% of the waste stream excluding
construction & demolition waste goes into landfill (DEFRA, 2000).
It is municipal waste that contains the largest amounts of methane producing active
biodegradable waste. This waste stream is growing by 3%/year.
 Table 6.1 Waste  Management in England and Wales 1998/19992.
Landfill Recovery (including
recycling, composting
& energy recovery)
Recycling/composting
Industrial waste
(excluding construction
& demolition)
47% 45% 39%
Commercial waste 66% 33% 29%
Municipal waste 83% 17% 9%
Source: PIU (2001)
Methane is a powerful greenhouse gas which landfill operators are obliged to collect and treat
either by flaring or through energy recovery. Landfill gas energy recovery schemes have been
supported by the Non Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO) and support for new schemes will
continue under the Renewables Obligation. Since the introduction of NFFO in 1990, 306
projects have been contracted with a planned capacity of 650MWe, of which 200MWe
(representing 107 projects) were operational at the end of 1998 (DEFRA, 2000).
Gas is currently utilised from six mines in the UK, with the industry anticipating another ten
to come on line soon. The trade association, Association of Coal Mine Methane Operators,
claim a potential 750MW from mines by 2010 is possible. The Association argues that sites
with a capacity below 5MW are not viable without subsidy, and that there are 100 sites with
potentials above 5MW and 300 sites above 1MW (ENDS, 2001). These are industry figures
whose empirical basis is unclear and should be treated cautiously – perhaps as indicating a
top-end, optimistic estimate of project potentials.
 6.1 Policy influences in methane recovery
There are four main policy instruments which target landfill activities and regulate them: the
Renewables Obligation scheme; the IPPC Directive; exemption of electricity from landfill
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gas from the CCL; and the Landfill Directive (which sets standards for the operation and
closure of landfills). In contrast, methane recovery from mines is relatively free from policy
instruments and at present is not eligible for either support from the Renewables Obligation
or the CCL exemption.11 Table 6.2 categorises these policies using our standard framework.
                                                
11 Draft Statutory Instrument 2002, 8(10) at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/si/si2002/draft/20029337.htm
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Table 6.2 Climate policy measures in the methane recovery area
 Broad category  Instrument type  Key instruments relevant to methane recovery sector
 Education,
information &
moral suasion
 Education, information
& moral suasion
 Voluntary
approaches
 Unilateral commitments
 
  Public voluntary
schemes
  Negotiated agreements
 Economic
instruments
 Charge systems • CCL – exemptions for renewables
  Trading mechanisms • Renewables Obligation
  Financial instruments • 
 Command and
control
 Framework based
standards
• IPPC Directive
• Landfill Directive
  Performance based
standards
• Landfill Directive
  Technology based
standards
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 6.2 Renewables Obligation
Instrument description
The Renewables Obligation was described in section 4.3. Landfill gas projects which
generate electricity are eligible to receive ROCs and concomitant revenues. The greatest
revenue operators of such projects can expect from the ROC market is effectively limited by
the Buyout Price (£30/MWh) – since if the market price for ROCs exceeds this level then it
becomes cheaper for electricity suppliers to pay the fine than buy ROCs.
It is worth noting that over half of the growth in renewables capacity between 1990 and 1998
has come from energy-from-waste plant (including landfill gas). In the fifth round of
renewable energy projects approved for price subsidy in 1998 (under the old NFFO scheme)
onshore wind comprised 29 per cent (by electrical capacity) of the projects approved, while
energy-from-waste made up 68 per cent (RCEP, 2000). Moreover, government anticipates
these technologies continuing to make a significant contribution: supplying over half the ten
per cent target for 2010 (DTI, 1999).
Additionality issues
As described in section 4.3, qualifying renewables projects can earn ROCs, and in some cases
can earn carbon credits as well, but not both for the same MWh. The process by which the
latter are created is different from the arrangements under the project scheme and relies on a
supplier baseline rather than a project baseline or a UK aggregate baseline.
Methane recovery projects that generate electricity and claim ROCs are unlikely to be
candidates for the creation of separate project credits under the project scheme, as this would
merely compound the problems of double counting. It is conceivable that such projects could
be allowed to generate credits, provided that they did not at the same time claim ROCs.
However, this seems unlikely as the sale of ROCs is likely to prove a substantially more
profitable revenue stream than the sale of carbon credits.
As with other renewables projects, the fact that such a route looks unpromising should not
necessarily mean that it is ruled out in principle.  However, if a methane recovery project
were to become eligible for crediting, there are serious questions over the system boundary.
For example, should a renewables project be awarded credits when the UK as a whole has
less renewables capacity than required under the Renewables Obligation? This question can
only be resolved with reference to broader UK energy policy objectives.
A secondary question is whether a methane recovery project that generates heat but not
electricity should be eligible for project credits.  These are entirely outside the Renewables
Obligation, so the above issues do not arise. In practice, such projects may be unlikely given
both the difficulty of using the heat at many landfill sites and the relative ease with which
profitable electricity generation can be added.  There is also the question of the incentives
created by IPPC and the Landfill Directive. These are described below.
 6.3 Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control
Landfills are regulated under the IPPC regulations - which were described in section 4.6. The
timetable suggests they will become regulated under IPPC from 2003. The European
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Commission has said that there will be no BREF Note for landfills. This is because the
necessary technical standards are covered in other Directives. Most notably, permit
conditions issued under IPPC will relate to prohibitions and targets introduced under the
Landfill Directive. The Landfill Directive is discussed below. The IPPC regulations provide
the administrative framework under which Landfill Directive requirements will be
implemented.
The IPPC Directive only applies to landfills receiving more than 10 tonnes/day, or where the
total capacity exceeds 25,000 tonnes. No information has been obtained to date on either the
number of landfills within different size categories, or on the regulations relevant to landfills
below the IPPC size boundary. This needs further work.
 6.4 Landfill Directive
The 1999 Landfill Directive ( 1999/31/EEC) sets a number of targets and prohibition
deadlines for items going to landfill. It requires landfills to be classified (e.g. as hazardous or
non-hazardous waste facilities) and sets standards accordingly.
Instrument operation
The IPPC regulations will be the process by which the Landfill Directive will be
implemented. The government anticipates the process of issuing all relevant landfills with
IPPC permits to be complete by 2007 (DEFRA, 2001b: 8). The objectives of the Landfill
Directive objectives are as follows:
• Reduce bio-degradable waste inputs
- to 75 per cent of the 1995 level by 2010
- to 50 per cent of the 1995 level by 2013
- to 35 per cent of the 1995 level by 2020
• Ban co-disposal of hazardous and non-hazardous waste after July 2002
• Ban the landfill of whole tyres by 2003 and by 2006 for shredded tyres
• Ban the landfill of liquid wastes, infectious clinical materials and certain types of
hazardous waste (e.g. explosive, flammable wastes)
• Set standards for the control, monitoring, reporting and closure of landfill sites.
The government’s Waste Strategy 2000 is intended to set out the changes in waste
management needed to respond to the Landfill Directive amongst other drivers.
Landfill operators must submit a Site Conditioning Plan to the regulator (the Environment
Agency) that sets out how the operator proposes to comply with the Directive. These plans
must be submitted by July 2002. On the basis of these plans, some operators will be required
to operate as normal under existing Waste Management Licenses for the time being. Others
will have to apply for an IPPC permit that incorporates Directive conditions.
The Environment Agency is producing Technical Guidance concerning how Landfill
Directive requirements and IPPC can be fulfilled, including BAT for landfills. The Directive
stipulates that provisions should be in place for care of the landfill once it is closed (Article
13), i.e. after it has ceased to accept waste. This includes monitoring of landfill gas. The
Environment Agency has produced draft technical guidance that includes information on the
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management of landfill gas.12 The Directive does not stipulate how landfill gas should be
managed, merely that ‘environmental protection systems are functioning fully as intended’
(Annex III). However, the Environment Agency draft technical guidance suggests it will
expect operators to consider the feasibility of utilising the gas to produce energy:
‘Landfill gas shall be collected from all landfills receiving biodegradable waste and the landfill gas
must be treated and used. If the gas collected cannot be used to produce energy, it must be flared’
(Environment Agency, 2001: 34)
It seems the Environment Agency will require landfills to install energy-from-gas projects
where appropriate as part of the BAT conditions under IPPC.
Additionality issues
Two additionality issues lie in the above introduction to methane from landfill. First, the
reduction in biodegradable inputs required from the Landfill Directive will, over time, reduce
the generation of methane from this sector. However, given the time-scale of the targets
relative to the lifetime of the ETS, methane reductions are unexpected to bite into the number
of energy-from-gas projects available from the current ‘stock’ and management of landfills.
Second, draft Environment Agency guidance on implementing the IPPC and Landfill
Directive regulations imply they will be looking for energy-from-gas projects in landfill
operators’ Site Conditioning Plans. It is unclear how vigorously the Agency will pursue this
preference. However, some sort of clarification should be sought since it obviously affects
the baseline and/or additionality assumptions underlying project mechanisms in the ETS.
 6.5 Climate Change Levy
The Utilities Act, 2000 Clause 50 defines renewable energy sources as ‘sources of energy
other than fossil fuel or nuclear fuel, but includes waste of which not more than a specified
proportion is waste which is, or is derived from, fossil fuel’. This is the definition cited by
HM Customs & Excise when deciding which renewable sources are exempt from the Climate
Change Levy. Electricity generated from landfill gas would appear to qualify for the CCL
exemption. However, since methane from mines is derived from fossil fuel, it would not
appear to qualify for exemption. At the time of publishing their guidelines on CCL
exemptions, in March 2001, mine methane projects were not exempt from the tax. However,
John Doddrell of the DTI Sustainable Energy Unit was reported as saying at a conference in
September 2001 that methane from mines would qualify the CCL exemption (ENDS, 2001b).
The current status of these projects with regard to the CCL therefore needs checking.
 6.6 Summary: policy additionality for methane recovery projects
The above review suggest that landfill projects that recover methane to produce electricity
are: a) eligible for Renewable Obligation Certificates; b) incentivised by exemption from the
CCL; and c) likely to be required, or at least strongly encouraged, under the Landfill
Directive and IPPC. In contrast, projects that recover methane to produce heat are only
incentivised by IPPC and the Landfill Directive. In both cases there is a need for policy
guidance on the eligibility of such projects for crediting. In particular, there is a need for
clarification of the treatment of such projects under IPPC.  This is entirely separate from the
                                                
12 See http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/commondata/105385/ippclandfill.pdf
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interpretation of the energy efficiency requirements of IPPC, which are relevant to projects in
other sectors.
The coexistence of multiple polices to encourage methane recovery from landfill would
appear to militate against the inclusion of such projects in the crediting scheme.  This is
particularly the case where the projects generate electricity and hence are eligible for ROCs.
In contrast, methane recovery from coal mines appears relatively free of policy influence and
hence of problems of policy additionality.  These projects are not eligible for ROCs and do
not, at present, qualify for exemption from the CCL. This suggests that such projects may be
good candidates for inclusion in the crediting scheme.
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 7. Policies in the transport area
Transport is the third largest source of greenhouse gas emissions in the UK and emissions are
increasing faster in transport than in any other sector.  In 2000, CO2 emissions from the UK
transport sector were 39.1MtC, an increase of 4% from 1990, while emissions from road
transport increased by 7.4% over this period. In the absence of policy initiatives, total GHG
emissions from transport are forecast to grow by 15% by 2010 (DETR, 2001).
The UK climate strategy relies heavily on an EU voluntary agreements with car
manufacturers to improve car fuel efficiency.  This is anticipated to reduce transport CO2
emissions by 4MtC/year by 2010.  In contrast, the full array of other transport initiatives
included in the government’s 10-year plan for transport (including £121 billion of capital
investment) is only expected to reduce emissions by 1.6MtC/year.  This illustrates the
strength of the underlying forces driving transport growth, and the extent to which transport
emissions are dominated by the private car. Transport is therefore a priority area for climate
policy, but one which has proven especially difficult to address.
It is not possible to treat the transport sector in the same manner as the other sectors discussed
in this report.  This is primarily because of the enormous range of potential projects that
could reduce carbon intensity in the transport sector.  At one extreme, we have large
infrastructure projects such as the upgrading of the East Coast mainline.  At the other
extreme, we have small-scale voluntary initiatives such as the introduction of a car sharing
scheme by a small business. In between there is an array of technical, behavioural, economic
and infrastructural initiatives which have varying impacts on transport emissions over
different time scales and which are difficult to group within simple categories. The policy
influences on such a diverse range of projects is correspondingly very large, as is the range of
organisations that could potentially be involved.
 7.1 Potential project types in the transport sector
Transport projects may save carbon emissions by reducing the carbon intensity of transport
services, in the same manner that energy efficiency projects save carbon emissions by
reducing the carbon intensity of energy services. Transport services primarily relate to
accessibility to jobs, leisure, retail and services.  But there are three ways in which transport
projects are likely to differ from many of the energy projects discussed in the previous
sections:
• Objectives: Transport projects are more likely to have multiple objectives - for example,
reducing congestion, tackling social exclusion, improving air quality etc – and to have
carbon saving as a secondary concern.
• Economics: The economics of transport projects are significantly more complex than
those of energy projects, with costs and benefits being distributed between a large number
of groups and with many of these not being reflected in market prices (e.g. the costs of
lost working due to congestion; the costs of damage to buildings through air pollution;
health costs of asthma etc.). Many transport projects - and particularly infrastructural
projects funded wholly or partially by local or national government -  are not justified
through straightforward investment appraisal alone, but through the consideration of
wider public objectives.
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• Carbon saving: The carbon saving associated with many transport projects is difficult to
assess, owing to wide or ‘fuzzy’ system boundaries and the need to make assumptions
based on limited data.  As an illustration, how do you quantify the impact of a new urban
cycle network on transport emissions in the urban area? Developing a counterfactual
baseline is likely to be significantly more difficult for a transport project than for an
energy efficiency or energy supply project. It is notable that transport projects are largely
absent from the AIJ program and from more recent crediting initiatives such as ERUPT.
As a first step towards classifying different types of transport projects we can distinguish
between:
• Reducing activity: Reducing the aggregate volume of transport demand, measured in
passenger or tonne km. This depends heavily on geographical factors, such as the average
distance between home and work, as well as income factors such as the demand for
foreign holidays.
• Changing modal structure: Displacing passenger (or tonne) km from carbon intensive
modes, such as passenger cars, to less intensive modes such as trains, buses, cycling &
walking.
• Reducing energy intensity: Reducing the energy use per passenger (or tonne) km for
individual transport modes. This depends on the technical efficiency of vehicles, and on
load factors and operating conditions.
• Reducing carbon intensity: Reducing the carbon emissions per unit of energy use in each
mode.  This primarily depends on the fuel mix.
It is possible to conceive of projects that influence one or more of these four variables.  In
addition, it may be also useful to classify projects according to:
• Scale: this may range from large infrastructure projects (e.g. a major new rail link), to
small neighbourhood initiatives (establishment of a Home Zone to encourage walking);
• Timeframe: this may range from very long (e.g. a new metro line), to relatively short (e.g.
refurbishment of existing trains to improve fuel efficiency); and
• System boundaries: this may range from narrow (e.g. conversion of a delivery fleet to gas
fuelling), or wide (e.g. developing a new high-density housing project on a brown field
site).
From the perspective of crediting, small projects with relatively short time frames and narrow
system boundaries are likely to create far fewer difficulties for both the estimation of
baselines and the demonstration of additionality.  Table 7.1 list some possible projects and
classifies them according to the above variables. While these are illustrative examples, they
do suggest that projects to reduce carbon/energy intensity may be more feasible for crediting
than those focused on reducing activity or encouraging modal shifts.
Most of the larger scale, longer term infrastructure projects in the UK are wholly or partially
funded by public authorities and would not be natural candidates for crediting.  However,
with increasing use of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) and other initiatives, private sector
involvement in infrastructure investment is increasing. This creates the possibility that the
private companies involved in infrastructure projects will explore opportunities for project
crediting.  Similarly, transport providers, such as rail franchisers & bus companies, are
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largely in the private sector and may similarly seek credits for investment projects that
improve carbon/energy intensity or displace passenger/tonne kms from more energy intensive
modes.
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Table 7.1 Illustrative projects in the transport sector
Area Example project Scale Timeframe System
boundary
Reducing travel
activity
Using a home delivery service to reduce the
number of car trips to a retail centre;
Small/
medium
Short Wide
Promoting high-density, mixed-use
developments in which travel requirements
for commuting, retail and leisure are
reduced; and
Large Long Wide
Local sourcing of fruit and vegetables, to
reduce the vehicle km associated with food
provision
Small/
medium
Short/
medium
Wide
Changing modal
structure
Public subsidy of bus services Medium Medium Medium
Investment in ‘safe routes to schools’; Small Long Wide
Major infrastructure provision, such as tram
services in city centres
Large Long Wide
Reducing energy
intensity
Fleet purchase of fuel efficient cars; Small/
medium
Short/
medium
Narrow
Establishment of car sharing schemes by
local authorities, business, community
organisations, schools, hospitals etc. as part
of the wider development of Green Transport
Plans.
Small/
medium
Short Narrow/
medium
Improvement of freight logistics to reduce
the amount of ‘empty running’ of freight
vehicles.
Medium Short Narrow
Reducing carbon
intensity
Conversion of vehicle fleets to alternative
fuels such as natural gas.
Small/
medium
Short/
medium
Narrow
Public investment in alternative fuel
infrastructures.
Medium/
Large
Long Medium/
long
 7.2 Policy influences in the transport sector
Organisations
Transport projects may involve a wide range of public and private organisations. We may
distinguish:
• organisations involved in land use planning & transport infrastructures (e.g. local
government, regional development agencies);
• organisations creating a demand for transport (e.g. employers; retailers; manufacturers);
• organisations supplying transport services (e.g. rail franchisers; bus & coach companies;
airlines; airport authorities)
• organisations supplying transport technologies (e.g. vehicle manufacturers, component
manufacturers, fuel suppliers);
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Each of these may initiate transport projects and individual projects could involve
organisations from more than one of these categories.  Similarly, each type of organisation
may be subject to a range of policy influences.  In addition to ‘climate policy’ (such as the
EU voluntary agreement on vehicle fuel efficiency), these include a much wider range of
policies related to land use planning, infrastructure developments, public investment,
technology promotion and so on. This creates a very complex policy landscape in which to
assess additionality.
In the public sector, transport projects commonly involve regional and/or local government,
as well as semi-autonomous bodies such as the Strategic Rail Authority, Regional
Development Agency, National Park Authorities and so on. These are responsible for a range
of activities including regulation, licensing, planning decisions and large-scale capital
investment. All operate within a framework established by central government, but have
substantial independence and autonomy.  This means that any assessment of policy
additionality for an individual project may need to examine the relevant policies of these
bodies, as well as legislation and initiatives by central government.  For example, transport
planning within a local area will operate within the framework of Local Transport Plans. A
very wide range of national, regional and local policy documents may therefore be relevant
when assessing public policy influences on transport projects.
Also relevant are initiatives by multinational bodies such as the EU, the International Civil
Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO).  The EU
has been influential in transport policy, most notably in concluding the recent voluntary
agreement with motor manufacturers to reduce CO2 emissions from new cars.  In contrast,
initiatives by the ICAO and the IMO have yet to have any serious impact on aviation and
shipping. This means that domestic and international shipping and aviation remain largely
unaffected by policy initiatives to reduce carbon emissions. Market incentives are leading to
positive improvements in energy efficiency in these sectors, but these are outweighed by
rapid increases in activity levels. Aviation & bunker fuels remain outside the Kyoto protocol
and exempt from taxation. Both the EU and the UK would prefer to wait until international
agreement has been secured on these issues, rather than introducing unilateral initiatives.
Policy framework
The framework for UK transport policy was set out in the 1998 White Paper A New Deal for
Transport: Better for Everyone (DETR, 1998).  This was followed in 2000 by Transport
2010 - The 10 Year Plan (DETR, 2000d), which outlined a £180bn spending programme,
including £121 billion of capital investment, split fairly equally between railways, roads and
local transport (including London). Relevant targets include a 50% increase in passenger use
of the railway, an 80% increase in rail freight, a 10% increase in bus passenger journeys, up
to 25 new light rail projects in major cities, 100 new bypasses and 360 miles of trunk road
and motorway widening.
Following the White Paper, policy initiatives have been established in a range of areas. Key
documents (available from the DTLR web site) include:
• A New Deal for Trunk Roads in England
• A New Deal for Railways
• From Workhorse to Thoroughbred: a Better Role for Bus Travel
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• Breaking the Logjam: Consultation Paper on Implementation of Congestion Charging and
Workplace Parking Schemes
• Sustainable Distribution: a Strategy
• Waterways for Tomorrow
• Guidance on Full Local Transport Plans
• Encouraging Walking: Advice to Local Authorities
As with transport projects, the character of transport policy is somewhat different from policy
in the energy sector. Regulations, such as emission standards, are well developed for road
vehicles but largely absent in other areas.  Furthermore, while focusing on air pollutants,
these standards generally do not extend to greenhouse gases.  Instead, transport policy is
dominated by a) direct support for capital or revenue expenditure; and b) guidance
documents for developers and other actors, particularly in the area of land use planning.
Capital investment
The capital investment initiated by the 10 year plan is set out in more detail in Table 7.2. This
represents a 70% increase in capital investment over the previous decade. It is notable that
46% of investment is anticipated to come from the private sector, through PPPs and other
contractual arrangements.  Government funding of regional and local transport initiatives is
now guided by Regional Transport Strategies and Local Transport Plans, rather than being
allocated on a scheme by scheme basis.
Table 7.2 Proposed UK capital investment on transport 2001 - 2010 (£billion)
Area Public investment Private investment Total investment
Strategic roads 13.6 2.6 16.2
Railways 14.7 34.3 49.1
Local transport 19.3 9.0 28.3
London 7.5 10.4 17.8
Other transport 0.7 N/a 0.7
Unallocated 9.0 N/a 9.0
Total 64.7 56.3 121.0
Source: DETR, 2000d
Guidance
Government policy on land use planning typically involves guidance and encouragement,
rather than mandatory requirements.  An example is PPG6 on Retail Development and Town
Centres, which discourages but does not prohibit the development of out-of-town shopping
centres.  In a similar manner, PPG13 on Transport offers broad-based guidance on all aspects
of land use planning with the aim of: a) promoting more sustainable transport choices; b)
promoting accessibility to jobs, shopping, leisure facilities and services by public transport,
walking and cycling; and c) reducing the need to travel, especially by car. This document
provides an overall framework in which Local Transport Plans are developed and provides a
strong steer towards lower carbon transport services.  But given the multi-faceted and site
specific nature of many planning decisions, together with the autonomy given to local
government and other planning bodies, the government can only provide guidance and not
mandatory requirements.
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A related feature of UK transport policy is the reliance on partnerships between the public
and private sectors, including the private funding of major infrastructural projects. Much of
this is aimed at encouraging voluntary initiatives by different bodies, such as the adoption of
Green Transport Plans by business, or the improvement of driver training by logistics
companies.
This dominance of guidance and partnerships means that much policy influence in the
transport area is at the ‘soft’ end of the spectrum (encouragement, information etc.) rather
than mandatory requirements for specific actions. In general, if the changes brought about by
a transport project are already required, funded, supported or encouraged by other policy
initiatives, there is a risk that the policy additionality requirement will not be met. But
additionality is clearly more difficult to assess when the dominant influences are guidance
and encouragement,  rather than specific requirements.  Coupled with the multiple objectives,
complex economics and system boundaries problems of transport projects described above, it
is clear that the assessment of policy additionality for transport projects is particularly
problematic.
Policies
The following four tables attempt to summarise some of the more important policy influences
in the transport sector, distinguishing between reducing activity, changing modal structure,
reducing energy intensity, and reducing carbon intensity. The tables use the same framework
as in previous sections, but with an additional category of public investment which is relevant
to infrastructure projects. Guidance material, such as that related to land use planning, is
classified under ‘education, information & moral suasion’. However, this form of guidance
carries more weight, and may correspondingly have greater impact, than simple information
programmes such as the EEBPP.
The list is illustrative and is not intended to be comprehensive. But it does illustrate the
diversity of relevant policy influences in the transport sector.  In contrast to previous sections,
no attempt will be made to describe each policy at greater length as this would be too big a
task.
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Table 7.3 Policy influences on transport activity levels
 Broad category  Instrument type  Key policies relevant to transport activity levels
 Public investment  Public investment • Investment plans by local authorities, within the framework of Local
Transport Plans and including measures to reduce the need to travel.  This
is part funded by central government.
 Education,
information &
moral suasion
 Education, information
& moral suasion
• All forms of guidance on land use planning, including in particular PPG13.
This aims to locate development where it can be easily accessed by
walking, cycling and public transport; creates a priority order of town
centre locations, followed by edge of centre sites, district and local centres,
and only then out of centre locations that are accessible by all forms of
transport. All new development should be shaped by this guidance.
• Regional Transport Strategies, ensuring co-ordination of transport
investment that reflects wider land use planning considerations.
 Voluntary
approaches
 Unilateral commitments
 
  Public voluntary
schemes
  Negotiated agreements
 Economic
instruments
 Charge systems
  Trading mechanisms
  Financial instruments
 Command and
control
 Framework based
standards
  Performance based
standards
  Technology standards
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Table 7.4 Policy influences on transport modal structure
 Broad category  Instrument type  Key policies relevant to transport modal structure
 Public investment  Public investment • Rail investment: including East & West Coast Main Lines, Channel Tunnel
Rail Link, Thameslink 2000 upgrading of freight routes to major ports,
improve commuter routes to London & other major cities, better
integration with buses taxis & bicycles, etc.
• Strategic road investment: including bypasses/widening schemes to reduce
congestion, HGV lanes on congested routes, improvement of junctions,
electronic technology for network management etc.
• Local transport investment: within the framework of local transport plans
and including bus priority systems, enhanced off-peak & night and
services, improved bus links to deprived urban areas, park & ride schemes,
local traffic management schemes, 20mph areas, safe routes to school,
improved cycle lanes & cycle networks, new light rail lines in major cities,
etc.
• London investment: including upgrading the London Underground via a
PPP, a new east-west rail link, new tram/guided bus systems, improved
off-peak and night bus services, street management & local transport
initiatives, extension of the Docklands light Railway, etc.
• Other investment: including information/booking/ticketing services for
integrated transport
 Education,
information &
moral suasion
 Education, information
& moral suasion
• All forms of guidance on land use planning, including in particular PPG13,
which aims to promote accessibility to jobs, shopping, leisure facilities and
services by public transport, walking and cycling
• Guidance on transport planning in a range of areas, for example
‘Encouraging Walking: Advice to Local Authorities’
• General public awareness campaigns such as ‘are you doing your bit?’
 Voluntary
approaches
 Unilateral commitments
 
• Voluntary adoption of green transport plans schemes by local authorities,
business, community organisations, schools, hospitals etc
  Public voluntary
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schemes
  Negotiated agreements
 Economic
instruments
 Charge systems • Road use charging by local authorities, enabled (but not required) by
government legislation, and with the requirement to spend the revenue
raised on local transport improvements for at least 10 years
• Levy on workplace parking by local authorities, enabled (but not required)
by government legislation, and with the requirement to spend the revenue
raised on local transport improvements for at least 10 years
• Proposed pilot charging schemes for motorways & trunk roads
  Trading mechanisms • 
  Financial instruments • Funding of voluntary green transport initiatives by schools & other bodies
• Fuel duty rebate to bus operators
• Extension of fuel duty rebates to more community transport services
• Concessionary fares for groups such as the elderly
• Rural bus subsidies, through the Rural Bus Partnership Fund and the Rural
Transport Partnership Scheme
• Ringfencing money from increases in fuel duty to fund improvements in
public transport
• Grants to promote rail freight
 Command and
control
 Framework based
standards
  Performance based
standards
• Enforcement of parking restrictions
  Technology based
standards
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Table 7.5 Policy influences on transport energy intensity
 Broad category  Instrument type  Key policies relevant to transport energy intensity
 Education,
information &
moral suasion
 Education, information
& moral suasion
• European Commission fuel economy labelling schemes for new cars
• EEBPP initiatives on freight & logistics, including improved driver
training
• General public awareness campaigns such as ‘are you doing your bit?’
 Voluntary
approaches
 Unilateral commitments
 
• Voluntary adoption of green transport plans schemes by local authorities,
business, community organisations, schools, hospitals etc
• Environmental best practice scheme by the Freight Transport Association
  Public voluntary
schemes
• Voluntary agreements between the European Commission and European,
Korean and Japanese car manufacturers to reduce average CO2 emissions
from new cars to 25% below 1995 levels by 2008
• Motorvate programme to for green car & van fleets, including targets of a
12% reduction in CO2 emissions over a three-year period (3% of which
through reduced mileage)
  Negotiated agreements • 
 Economic
instruments
 Charge systems • Exemption of electricity use the traction by rail freight operators from the
CCL
• Taxation of company cars according to CO2 emissions
  Trading mechanisms
  Financial instruments • Differential VED to encourage purchase of smaller, more fuel efficient
vehicles
• Differential on ultra low sulphur diesel to encourage adoption of direct
injection technology
• 100% first-year capital allowances for spending on information and
communication technologies by small & medium-sized haulage companies
 Command and
control
 Framework based
standards
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  Performance based
standards
• Enforcement of speed limits on roads
  Technology standards
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Table 7.6 Policy influences on transport carbon intensity
 Broad category  Instrument type  Key policies relevant to transport carbon intensity
 Education,
information &
moral suasion
 Education, information
& moral suasion
• information campaigns to encourage conversion of the vehicle fleets to
alternative fields
 Voluntary
approaches
 Unilateral commitments
 
  Public voluntary
schemes
  Negotiated agreements
 Economic
instruments
 Charge systems
  Trading mechanisms
  Financial instruments • Grants under the Powershift programme towards the additional cost of
purchasing gas & electric vehicles
 Command and
control
 Framework based
standards
  Performance based
standards
  Technology based
standards
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 Annex I:  Inclusion of the domestic sector
in the project scheme
The DTI have pointed out energy efficiency projects in the domestic sector are already
incentivised by the Energy Efficiency Commitments imposed upon domestic energy suppliers
(DETR, 2000e). In communication, it was noted that:
‘It was felt to be unfair to impose targets on electricity and supply companies that require them to
increase domestic sector energy efficiency measures and then allow other companies to carry out
some of these projects themselves which would raise the cost to companies of meeting these
targets.’13
Against this, the following points should be noted:
• The cost effective abatement potential in the domestic sector is very large.  The  recent
UK Energy Review estimated the potential to be 15MtC/year by 2020, at a cost of -£300
to £50/tonne (PIU, 2002).
• The quality of the UK housing stock is acknowledged to be extremely poor, contributing
to five million households living in ‘fuel poverty’. This is the target of a major
government strategy, including measures such as the Home Energy Efficiency Scheme to
increase public and private investment in domestic sector energy efficiency.
• There is uncertainty over how the carbon savings in the domestic sector projected in the
UK climate program will be achieved. Five times the savings of EEC 2002-2005 will
need to be achieved in further EEC or HEES programmes from 2005-2010 if the targets
are to be met (Ekins et al, 2001). Underachievement appears likely in this sector and may
threaten attainment of the UK carbon target.
• The government has indicated it is desire to promote innovative methods for delivering
energy efficiency in the sector, including energy service packages (Macklon, 2001).
In view of this, the argument for excluding the domestic sector from the project scheme
appears to be weak. By doing so, major social, economic and environmental opportunities
may be missed.
                                                
13 DTI, personal communication.
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